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A New U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan

Chaired by Richard N. Haass
Reviewed by By Donald Zagoria
July/August 1997
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Chaired by Richard N. Haass
Council on Foreign Relations
1997
81 pp.
$5.00

An independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations urges that instead of trying to roll back India's and Pakistan's de facto nuclear capabilities, the United States discourage nuclear testing and deployment and the export of related technologies. With India, it urges a closer strategic relationship. With Pakistan, Congress should allow limited conventional arms sales and military assistance to fund education and training programs, untie economic assistance programs from nuclear developments, and repeal prohibitions against loans that facilitate U.S. business activity. Moreover, at the Pentagon, National Security Council, and CIA, South Asian issues are treated intermittently and secondarily by the relevant regional bureaus while attracting constant attention from nonproliferation experts, contributing to the dominance of their concerns. The panel recommends that the U.S. military treat both countries as part of the Pacific Command, and that the National Security Council have at least one full-time person assigned to South Asia.

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