The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace
This volume represents social science at its best. It is a detailed case study of the Kashmiri insurgency, in which India has deployed 400,000 troops, 15,000 people have died, and 200,000 have become refugees. The book is based on extensive interviews with government officials, Kashmiri activists, journalists, and military personnel -- all against the background of an interesting theory as to why a full-blown popular insurgency emerged when it did. Ganguly's central argument is that the timing of the insurgency can be explained by the linked processes of political mobilization and institutional decay. In an attempt to woo the citizens of Kashmir, the national government in New Delhi dramatically helped expand literacy, mass media, and higher education, which produced a generation of politically sophisticated Kashmiris. At the same time, however, the national government, fearful of secessionism, also stultified the development of Kashmiri political institutions. The volume concludes with some sensible recommendations for moving toward a resolution of the crisis.
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India's military humiliation at the hands of China in 1962 set in motion a process of internal political deterioration which still continues. The first impact of the unimpeded Chinese advance had brought a temporary surge of fellow feeling and patriotic fervor; but the deeper and more lasting consequence of the rout at Bomdila was the virtual destruction of the unprecedented sense of national confidence so carefully nurtured by Nehru during his years of leadership. What was left of dynamism and élan soon faded away as India's inability to strike back in the foreseeable future became more and more abundantly clear to a demoralized nationalist élite.
Last year's nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan brought world attention to the decades-old Kashmir conflict. Claimed by both countries, the former princely state has been ravaged by a war that shows no sign of ending. Both rivals have invested heavily in blood and treasure to make Kashmir their own. Now Afghan-trained mujahideen are leading the fight, bringing their own foreign brand of radical Islam. Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has ever asked what Kashmiris want. They would not like the answer: more than anything else, Kashmiris hope to be left alone.
I Shall endeavor to recapitulate briefly the genesis of the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to indicate what solutions have been considered in the past, apart from the main solution of an over-all plebiscite, that might well furnish a ground for future action in determining its disposition.
