The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision Making in China
This pathbreaking volume, written by a former career Chinese foreign service officer who now lives and works in Singapore, is the best book published to date on the process of foreign policy-making in China. Based on a wealth of Chinese and Western data, personal experience, and interviews, the volume provides fascinating and important details on, for example, the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War and on the Chinese rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s. There is a brief but trenchant analysis of the change in foreign policy decision-making after Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978 and the shift in focus on the part of the central leadership from the nation's physical security (which no longer seems to be threatened) to its economic development. The author also analyzes the erosion of the preponderant role of the paramount leader and the emergence of a more collectivized decision-making process with checks and balances, which leads to greater authority for both the foreign affairs establishment and for other bureaucracies, at the expense of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese military, says the author, has not become an independent force in foreign policy decision-making, but instead remains firmly under the control of established guidelines formulated by the civilian central leadership.
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One of the great "ifs" and harsh ironies of history hangs on the fact that in January 1945, four and a half years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, in an effort to establish a working relationship with the United States, offered to come to Washington to talk in person with President Roosevelt. What became of the offer has been a mystery until, with the declassification of new material, we now know for the first time that the United States made no response to the overture. Twenty-seven years, two wars and x million lives later, after immeasurable harm wrought by the mutual suspicion and phobia of two great powers not on speaking terms, an American president, reversing the unmade journey of 1945, has traveled to Peking to treat with the same two Chinese leaders. Might the interim have been otherwise?
The great hurrahs of the Cultural Revolution, the slogans, the messianic fervor, the public humiliation of the heretics are all gone. A visitor to Peking is impressed by nothing so much as by the return to normalcy, by pragmatism and-if one could imagine it in a Spartan land-a feeling of relaxation. Indeed, one might easily think that there had never been the awesome upheaval of 1966-69 "to change men's souls." Human frailty is once again understood, and there is at least an implied recognition that man does not live by faith alone.
Americans often think China's leadership is split between hard-liners and moderates. It is not. The sooner Washington understands that Beijing is unified, the better.

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