How Close We Came
Article Summary
With exclusive access to newly opened Soviet records, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali reveal that Kennedy blinked too soon and Khrushchev declared victory.
Steven Merritt Miner is Professor of History at Ohio University.
One might, however, draw very different conclusions from the book's evidence. Ideological sympathy, not simply the calculations of great-power rivalry, played a large role in the Kremlin's decision to support Castro. Anastas Mikoyan, the tough and wily survivor of the Stalin years and chairman of the Presidium from 1964-65, was charmed by Fidel at their first meeting, gushing, "Yes, he is a genuine revolutionary. Completely like us. I felt as though I had returned to my childhood!" The Soviet leaders were acutely aware of their relative weakness vis-à-vis the United States in strategic forces, yet Khrushchev decided to extend a nuclear guarantee to revolutionaries on a small Caribbean island half a world away, thereby imperiling the Soviet Union and creating a strategic liability it could scarcely defend against a determined American attack. Furthermore, although Soviet fears that Castro might be drawn into the Chinese orbit might be explained as traditional power concerns, how, other than in ideological terms, can one explain the fear of the heretical Albanians?
One of the most interesting portions of the book recounts the conversations between Khrushchev and Castro when the latter visited the U.S.S.R. after the resolution of the missile crisis. The Soviet leader conducted what the authors evocatively describe as "a seminar on ruthlessness." A survivor of the hard school of Stalinism, Khrushchev cited Lenin's comment, "If it becomes necessary to use terror to achieve important political goals, then it must be employed energetically and with celerity." "One must always keep in mind," Khrushchev continued, "that at the very first moment of any anti-governmental activity, one must crush it quickly, decisively, not stopping in the event it becomes necessary to open fire." Not to be outdone, Castro boasted of his own mercilessness with domestic enemies of his regime. As a stilted translation reads, "My revolution has also not shrunk from serious decisive measures if dictated by necessity. The proof of this was the shooting of military and political criminals, the arrests of many saboteurs and intelligence agents of foreign powers." Such remarks might give pause to those who still view Castro as a romantic, misunderstood figure.
BOMBS AWAY
As for the results of the missile crisis, the authors provide fascinating insights. As is well known, the Americans secured the removal of the nuclear missiles from Cuba, much to the chagrin of Castro, who was excluded from the negotiations with Soviet officials as they reached a frenzy in October 1962. Although Washington insisted only on the withdrawal of the medium-range missiles, the Soviets also removed their tactical warheads -- almost as an afterthought -- for fear that American intelligence might discover them and reopen the Cuban wound.
In exchange for the removal of Soviet nuclear weapons, Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba and agreed to remove American missiles from Turkey. One of the book's interesting revelations is Moscow's relative lack of concern about the missiles in Turkey: the Soviets did not even insist on their removal as part of an overall settlement. In fact, Moscow believed that Kennedy would never agree to link the two issues. The Turkish missiles only became an issue when Washington tipped its hand by admitting that it was prepared for such a deal. Kennedy's hired mythmakers immediately set to work covering up the blunder for fear it would anger America's Western European allies and harm the president's political standing.
In a postmortem to his colleagues in the Presidium, Khrushchev claimed victory. While acknowledging that "it would have been better not to have had to remove these missiles," he noted that the Americans had pledged not to invade Cuba, thereby ensuring that the Soviets would continue to have a foothold in the Western hemisphere: "So who suffered defeat? Who did not get what he wanted? We attained our goal; so they lost, we won." While Khrushchev's comments were no doubt self-serving, Castro's continuing reign suggests the Soviet leader was not entirely wrong.
Although Moscow gained a great deal from the American pledge not to invade Cuba, Khrushchev believed that those gains depended largely on Kennedy's personal word. This was, no doubt, in part because the Soviet premier understood how important leadership changes in the Kremlin were and believed the same dynamics prevailed in the United States. But Khrushchev also had a dismal view of American politics, which he believed to be a snake pit of contending cliques of generals and industrialists. His preconceptions were only reinforced by the ham-fisted diplomacy of the president's brother, Robert, who in a misguided attempt to pressure the Kremlin informed Moscow through back channels that only Kennedy himself could restrain the warmongers in the Pentagon from launching a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.
GOLDEN BOYS?
