Memoires de Guerre
They have to be read in French, of course. The translations are adequate but cannot fully do justice to the restrained lyricism, the classical lucidity, the gravitas of a style that was the product of hard work, concentrated thought, a Catholic education -- and a powerful personality. In French, de Gaulle's style is immediately recognizable -- like the man, it is both unique and the quintessential expression of a language and culture.
Why de Gaulle rather than Churchill? The general's canvas, after all, is narrower: his passionately exclusive concern is Notre Dame la France, not the world. But de Gaulle's narrative, perhaps because of this focus, is even more epic than Churchill's; it is the story of a fall, of a slow and difficult revival, and of final salvation. Also, it is less sprawling, more economical, more deliberately a work of art. And it offers the readers a priceless gallery of portraits, pithy and compassionate (even Laval and Hitler are treated serenely and humanely). De Gaulle, in one of his many gloomy moments, said that he may well have written the last pages of France's grandeur. He was referring to his role in history, but the remark applies to these books as well.
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France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, is often charged with being anti-American. As his new book shows, however, his brand of realist diplomacy is more subtle and pragmatic than his American critics see it.
Three years after having signed a treaty of coöperation with Dr. Adenauer, designed to make the marriage of France and Germany the foundation for the regrouping of Europe, General de Gaulle has travelled to the Soviet Union to talk of rediscovered friendship, agreement and even "alliance" between the "new France" and the "new Russia." Now the latter, pending information to the contrary, is the principal adversary of the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet leaders do not hide the fact that they look upon the rapprochement with Paris as a means of gaining support against German "revanchism." We may therefore be permitted to question the degree of coherence in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and to wonder whether such changes of course-there are other examples-cannot be best explained by psychological factors, the first of them being excessive amour propre.
In 1962 the European enthusiasts in Brussels were explaining regretfully that although British membership would slow down the process of European integration-perhaps severely impede the whole movement toward a United States of Europe-it was a price that had to be paid for widening the geographical spread of the Community. No doubt these people, while regretting the manner of General de Gaulle's rupture of negotiations with Britain, are now privately relieved that the price will not have to be paid. Their view is that Britain's inherent weakness is such that she will be compelled sooner or later to come back and knock on the door again and plead for entry into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). On the whole, better later than sooner. The European Community will by then have consolidated itself; it will be able to impose its terms with less difficulty and, in fairness it should be added, will be less niggling about making small concessions which may contravene the letter, though not the spirit, of the Treaty of Rome.

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