Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster; Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War
As sometimes happens, the rascal wrote the better book. Wolf was East Germany's most famous and successful spymaster, and though he does not reveal all, he tells an intriguing tale. Some will be surprised or dismayed to learn that, yes, during the 1980s the East Germans did indeed fund portions of the West German "peace movement" and provide a safe haven for terrorists. Wolf's selective memory, continual attempts at self-exculpation, and specious resort to the argument that the West behaved as badly as the communists are neither convincing nor appetizing.
Murphy and Kondrashev obtrude less in the account they, a retired American and Soviet spy, have written with a former American journalist. All three men in different ways operated in and around Berlin and know the city well. Part of a fascinating Yale University Press series on the Cold War seen in part from the vantage point of the Soviet archives, this book covers primarily the grim glory days of the Cold War in Berlin -- the period up to the building of the Berlin Wall. The lacunae are numerous (there is very little here, for example, from the Soviet side on the operations of Soviet military intelligence), and Bailey's efforts to reconcile his co-authors' views of reality do not always succeed. Nonetheless, this is a major contribution to the intelligence history of the Cold War.
Related
Washington wants to hire ex-Baathists to help rebuild Iraq. The CIA's experience using ex-Nazis to run West Germany's intelligence service should give it pause.
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
WHEN the Western European Union was founded, and when the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO, there existed a uniform political concept which was supported by all partners in the alliance. On it was based the strategic concept, which in turn was the basis for setting force requirements that were to be built up and maintained by all the members. In the course of the last few years, however, we have seen a growing divergence of opinion on the basic questions of our common defense and strategy. By the time President Kennedy took office, the concept which had been in effect up to that time-namely the principle of massive deterrence and, should it fail, of massive retaliation-was no longer considered by the United States to be credible. Strategy was adapted to the development of modern weapons technology and flexible response was made the official and binding American military doctrine.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.