Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster; Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War
As sometimes happens, the rascal wrote the better book. Wolf was East Germany's most famous and successful spymaster, and though he does not reveal all, he tells an intriguing tale. Some will be surprised or dismayed to learn that, yes, during the 1980s the East Germans did indeed fund portions of the West German "peace movement" and provide a safe haven for terrorists. Wolf's selective memory, continual attempts at self-exculpation, and specious resort to the argument that the West behaved as badly as the communists are neither convincing nor appetizing.
Murphy and Kondrashev obtrude less in the account they, a retired American and Soviet spy, have written with a former American journalist. All three men in different ways operated in and around Berlin and know the city well. Part of a fascinating Yale University Press series on the Cold War seen in part from the vantage point of the Soviet archives, this book covers primarily the grim glory days of the Cold War in Berlin -- the period up to the building of the Berlin Wall. The lacunae are numerous (there is very little here, for example, from the Soviet side on the operations of Soviet military intelligence), and Bailey's efforts to reconcile his co-authors' views of reality do not always succeed. Nonetheless, this is a major contribution to the intelligence history of the Cold War.
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Washington wants to hire ex-Baathists to help rebuild Iraq. The CIA's experience using ex-Nazis to run West Germany's intelligence service should give it pause.
The great solidarity Europe showed America after September 11 has started to wear off, and real differences have opened up in the transatlantic pursuit of homeland security. Europe's reluctance to take necessary steps to tighten security has made America more vulnerable. And unless cooperation improves, Europe will also be increasingly at risk.
Before World War I, German planners prepared for only one contingency: an all-out, two-front war. In July 1914, this made it difficult for Germany to match Russia's military preparations without automatically escalating into general war. Before World War II, French military planners also prepared for only one contingency: full-scale invasion of France. This made it difficult for France to react effectively when Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936. Both the German and French governments went wrong by assuming, rather than judging, where the main threat lay. Each country put tremendous effort into elaborating its war plans and force structure, down to the most minute detail. And yet each seems to have given only the most cursory attention to the political contingencies in which those plans and forces might have to be used. Hence the plans and force structures turned out to be not only irrelevant but-because of their rigidity-downright harmful.
