The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
The great merit of this volume lies in its analysis of the strategic outlook and policy dilemmas of a host of states in Eurasia, a tour d'horizon lucidly rendered. Brzezinski's analysis of the triangular relationship among China, Japan, and America -- together with the policy recommendations flowing therefrom -- is particularly good. But the heart of the book is the ambitious strategy it prescribes for extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward to Ukraine and lending vigorous support to the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, part and parcel of what might be termed a strategy of "tough love" for the Russians. That grand design is problematic for two reasons: one is that the excessive widening of Western institutions may well introduce centrifugal forces into them; a second is that Brzezinski's test of what constitutes legitimate Russian interests is so stringent that even a democratic Russia is likely to fail it. Russia, in effect, is to be accorded the geopolitical equivalent of basketball's full court press (whereas China, by contrast, merits the geopolitical equivalent of football's prevent defense). Given Russia's weak and friendless condition, a point to which Brzezinski frequently returns, that strategy is difficult to square with the author's otherwise sensible emphasis on ensuring a balance of power in Eurasia.
Related
The September 11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath have spurred a renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia. Despite official rhetoric, America is likely to remain militarily engaged there for some time. To manage this relationship effectively, Washington needs a better grasp on the realities of this complex and troubled region.
Russia and the United States have settled on oil as the basis of a new partnership. This move is dangerous, however, because it ignores the divergent interests of the two countries and their inability to influence global oil markets. Indeed, war in Iraq could tear this partnership apart. A far better basis for U.S. - Russian ties would be the two nations' durable common interest in developing and safeguarding nuclear power.
The USA and USSR share an interest in stability, in the survival of Gorbachev and his initiatives, and in the adoption of a gradual, multilateral approach to German re-unification. The US choice is between (1) using the CFE negotiating structure to "perpetuate and legitimize an Eastern alliance that is imploding" (2) forgoing any follow-up to CFE by letting events take their course. The former course is preferable, providing a security framework through which change in Europe can be managed.
