The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
The great merit of this volume lies in its analysis of the strategic outlook and policy dilemmas of a host of states in Eurasia, a tour d'horizon lucidly rendered. Brzezinski's analysis of the triangular relationship among China, Japan, and America -- together with the policy recommendations flowing therefrom -- is particularly good. But the heart of the book is the ambitious strategy it prescribes for extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward to Ukraine and lending vigorous support to the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, part and parcel of what might be termed a strategy of "tough love" for the Russians. That grand design is problematic for two reasons: one is that the excessive widening of Western institutions may well introduce centrifugal forces into them; a second is that Brzezinski's test of what constitutes legitimate Russian interests is so stringent that even a democratic Russia is likely to fail it. Russia, in effect, is to be accorded the geopolitical equivalent of basketball's full court press (whereas China, by contrast, merits the geopolitical equivalent of football's prevent defense). Given Russia's weak and friendless condition, a point to which Brzezinski frequently returns, that strategy is difficult to square with the author's otherwise sensible emphasis on ensuring a balance of power in Eurasia.
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What enthusiasts took for a global rush to democracy may be reversing direction, with backsliding and stalled transitions in the former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East. So far, one sees disarray or new strongmen much like the old; no competing ideologies seem to be beckoning. Market reforms have not been the cause in most cases. More affluent countries with Western ties seem to be sticking the course better. However the trend plays out, it should lead the administration to rethink democracy promotion. The truth is that U.S. policy is not significantly responsible for democracy's advance or retreat in the world.
The dance symbolizes the over-militarization of the superpowers, leading to stagnation in the USSR and undermining the USA economically. Notes some political constraints (demonstrated by the dismissal of Yeltsin) on Gorbachev's domestic programme, as well as his conduct of foreign affairs. By 1987, Reagan faced 'new thinking' on the part of the USSR, a Democrat-controlled Senate and the Iran-Contra affair, as well as economic problems, a major cause of which has been military expenditures. These trends led to a cautious improvement in superpower relations in 1987.
The September 11 terrorist attacks and their aftermath have spurred a renewed U.S. interest in Central Asia. Despite official rhetoric, America is likely to remain militarily engaged there for some time. To manage this relationship effectively, Washington needs a better grasp on the realities of this complex and troubled region.
