The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
The great merit of this volume lies in its analysis of the strategic outlook and policy dilemmas of a host of states in Eurasia, a tour d'horizon lucidly rendered. Brzezinski's analysis of the triangular relationship among China, Japan, and America -- together with the policy recommendations flowing therefrom -- is particularly good. But the heart of the book is the ambitious strategy it prescribes for extending the Euro-Atlantic community eastward to Ukraine and lending vigorous support to the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, part and parcel of what might be termed a strategy of "tough love" for the Russians. That grand design is problematic for two reasons: one is that the excessive widening of Western institutions may well introduce centrifugal forces into them; a second is that Brzezinski's test of what constitutes legitimate Russian interests is so stringent that even a democratic Russia is likely to fail it. Russia, in effect, is to be accorded the geopolitical equivalent of basketball's full court press (whereas China, by contrast, merits the geopolitical equivalent of football's prevent defense). Given Russia's weak and friendless condition, a point to which Brzezinski frequently returns, that strategy is difficult to square with the author's otherwise sensible emphasis on ensuring a balance of power in Eurasia.
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Will Russia be run by democrats or oligarchs? The signs are worrying. The West would rather not dwell on the extent to which Russia's market is dominated by robber barons and permeated by crime and corruption. Russia's democracy is weak, with unfair election campaigns, a compromised media, and few checks on the presidency. The West cannot afford to let Russia descend into chaos, which might mean losing control of Russia's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, but its two-faced NATO expansion policy hurts the democrats' chances.
Written in anticipation of the third summit and the signing of the INF treaty, concludes that Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy and seems prepared to settle for a prolonged stalemate in terms of strategic superiority to the USA. This leads him to seek arms control agreements as a means of codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Washington's policy of selective containment is balanced by Moscow's policy of selective commitment.
The dance symbolizes the over-militarization of the superpowers, leading to stagnation in the USSR and undermining the USA economically. Notes some political constraints (demonstrated by the dismissal of Yeltsin) on Gorbachev's domestic programme, as well as his conduct of foreign affairs. By 1987, Reagan faced 'new thinking' on the part of the USSR, a Democrat-controlled Senate and the Iran-Contra affair, as well as economic problems, a major cause of which has been military expenditures. These trends led to a cautious improvement in superpower relations in 1987.
