Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War
This work, by a political scientist at UCLA, considers a variety of explanations for the proclivity of states to mistrust one another. The author believes that the United States and the Soviet Union missed a number of opportunities to cooperate during the Cold War, the reason being their profound suspicion of one another's motives rather than underlying conflicts of interest between the two. Not all the five cases Larson studies -- centering around various phases of the German problem and arms control negotiations -- are equally persuasive. It is doubtful, for instance, that the West's interest lay in pursuing the idea of German unification in exchange for German neutrality. While Larson has perceptive things to say about the phenomenon of mistrust and how to overcome it, she minimizes the dangers that may be associated with the unilateral concessions necessary to build confidence in the other side. Nowhere mentioned in this book is the devastating experience of the preliminaries to World War II that haunted this generation of American policymakers, a memory that made them twice shy in dealing with Stalin's successors. The lessons for building trust the author adduces would be more applicable "to areas such as the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Korea" if the point were registered that while mistrust may indeed lead to missed opportunities, trust has on occasion led to disaster.
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American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."
Reprints extracts of an article first published in the Apr 1951 issue of FA, after the Korean invasion had intensified the Cold War, which prophetically described the possible characteristics of a post-Soviet Russia, of which US foreign policy-makers ought to be cognizant. The reprint does not make clear where the 'cuts' have been made.
The next president will have to reassess the U.S.-Russian relationship and find the right balance between pushing back and cooperating.

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