The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963-February 15, 1964
An enthralling and sardonic study of the events and personalities surrounding the ouster and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem. Winters, who teaches ethics and international affairs at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, writes persuasively of the folly and high-minded intolerance that lay behind "the Kennedy campaign to superimpose on Saigon the image of Washington." This undertaking at once augured the subsequent Americanization of the war and eliminated the one South Vietnamese leader with solid nationalist credentials (a point not lost on the North Vietnamese, dumbfounded and delighted by the American-sponsored coup). Among those pressing for Diem's removal, ironically, were Undersecretary of State George Ball and New York Times correspondent David Halberstam, both of whom later became trenchant critics of the war but who receive here pointed criticism for their role in 1963. The one false note struck by Winters is his belief that Kennedy intended to withdraw from Vietnam after the 1964 elections. It might more plausibly be argued that the coup against Diem truly represented the point of no return, and that Kennedy's private comments pointing to withdrawal (made before the coup) represented a slender hope rather than a matured conviction.
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The debate over Laos, almost as intense if not as bitter as the Vietnam debate, has done more than clarify the nature of the American involvement in that patchwork kingdom which has played a secondary but significant role in the Vietnam war while also engaging in its own struggle to survive as a unitary nation. The Senate's dual actions in prohibiting the use of ground combat troops in both Laos and Thailand, and in curbing the right of the President to make a "national commitment" to any country without prior Congressional approval, have temporarily satisfied the common determination to avoid "another Vietnam." But the fundamental problem of how American policy should be made and conducted in Southeast Asia has only begun to be reëxamined.
The United States has done much to enable China's recent growth, but it has also sent mixed signals that have unnerved Beijing. More consistent engagement is in order, because the course of the twenty-first century will be determined by the relationship between the world's greatest power and the world's greatest emerging power.
No country can affect China's fortunes more directly than the United States. Many potential flashpoints -- such as Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea -- remain, and true friendship between Washington and Beijing is unlikely. But their interests have grown so intertwined that cooperation is the best way to serve both countries.

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