The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe
One more book about the German Question! A set of chapters examines public and elite opinion about Germany in the United States, where "ambivalence about things German" prevails, in Austria, where a strong affinity to Germany goes along with "unquestioned autonomy," and in Western Europe, where the authors find the British less insecure than the French, although German unification had "a seriously unsettling effect on both." Another set of chapters deals in depth with the issue of German power. These chapters find the restrictions on German troops abroad "self-imposed and ideological rather than externally or institutionally constructed," thus resulting from "a particular collective memory" that could be fading. They show how much the European Union favors German economic power and wealth and "reduces that of its major trading partners." They fear a decline of Atlanticism and of the commitment to European integration in the post-Kohl era, and the rise of voices that would like to "normalize" Auschwitz -- not because they do not welcome the gradual transformation of "guilt, shame, and responsibility" into "knowledge, acknowledgment, and analysis," but because they are not sure that "this major change" would "bode well for the future of the Berlin Republic and its neighbors." The debate will continue. But by rejecting complacency, the authors provoke us into remaining concerned.
Related
Despite the myriad setbacks of recent months, the U.S.-European alliance is not doomed. But repairing it will require a strategic overhaul no less bold than that which followed the end of the Cold War. The key to today's transatlantic divide is not power but purpose. To revive and revamp the alliance, therefore, the United States and the European Union must forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era: expanding the Euro-Atlantic community and stabilizing the greater Middle East.
In the past, Germany has redefined itself as a nation only with dramatic consequences. Today it faces four distinct foreign policy choices: a deepening of the European Community; a widening of the EU and NATO to include Germany's eastern neighbors; a partnership with Russia; or the unilateral taking on of the rights and responsibilities of a world power, with all its financial and military obligations. What should Germany do? Take the eastern route, widening Europe so that it has stable democracies on both its flanks. What will Germany do? Probably nothing. Keeping to its postwar traditions, it will choose not to choose.
Washington wants to hire ex-Baathists to help rebuild Iraq. The CIA's experience using ex-Nazis to run West Germany's intelligence service should give it pause.

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