The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe
One more book about the German Question! A set of chapters examines public and elite opinion about Germany in the United States, where "ambivalence about things German" prevails, in Austria, where a strong affinity to Germany goes along with "unquestioned autonomy," and in Western Europe, where the authors find the British less insecure than the French, although German unification had "a seriously unsettling effect on both." Another set of chapters deals in depth with the issue of German power. These chapters find the restrictions on German troops abroad "self-imposed and ideological rather than externally or institutionally constructed," thus resulting from "a particular collective memory" that could be fading. They show how much the European Union favors German economic power and wealth and "reduces that of its major trading partners." They fear a decline of Atlanticism and of the commitment to European integration in the post-Kohl era, and the rise of voices that would like to "normalize" Auschwitz -- not because they do not welcome the gradual transformation of "guilt, shame, and responsibility" into "knowledge, acknowledgment, and analysis," but because they are not sure that "this major change" would "bode well for the future of the Berlin Republic and its neighbors." The debate will continue. But by rejecting complacency, the authors provoke us into remaining concerned.
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FOR five years between 1925 and 1929, a certain portion of mankind, like those parched travelers in the desert who think they have glimpsed the oasis which will save them, believed the gate to lasting peace was at hand. This, as we now know, was only a mirage. But such a mirage had never before existed. People had never believed so fervently in the blessings of peace, or hoped so passionately that peace would be perpetual. Optimism rose to new heights. "Away with cannon and machineguns: instead, conciliation, arbitration, and peace!" At the meeting of the League of Nations on September 10, 1926, when Germany, recently defeated, was received as a member, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand touched a new intensity of emotion with these celebrated words.
The surface was all smiles and harmony. After years of transatlantic distress, the major nations of the democratic West assembled in May in the splendor of Colonial Williamsburg to manifest their unity and their confidence. There were two new faces among the seven heads of state and government, both symbols of a significant political change in their respective countries: West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had replaced Helmut Schmidt in October 1982 and whose party, the Christian Democrats, had just been confirmed by a massive popular vote on March 6, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the leader of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and government who, in striking contrast to his predecessors, articulated a newly confident, internationally minded Japan.
After President Nixon and I met at Key Biscayne on December 28 and 29, 1971, a commentator pointed out that the joint statement issued on our talks seemed more like an American-European than an American-German communiqué. This, he felt, showed itself even on the surface in that the terms "European" or "Europe" appeared 11 times whereas German" or "Federal Republic of Germany" were only mentioned twice.
