The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century: False Starts on the Path to the Global Millennium
The author, who in 1994 was forced to leave Singapore to avoid lawsuits and imprisonment after writing a newspaper article critical of the government's political leadership, now strikes back. His argument is that all the talk about the "Asian Century" is excessively optimistic and that the conservatism, authoritarianism, and inflexibility of East Asia's economic and political institutions will interfere with the processes necessary for sustaining the high growth rates of the past. Corruption and rising crime are, he says, reaching "epidemic proportions," partly because of the moral void that authoritarian and socialist regimes create. Also, according to the author, many Asian economies are distinguished by an institutional bias against individualism. Although the book suffers from overgeneralization, the basic argument is an important one. In the information age, is rapid economic development handicapped by authoritarian institutions?
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THE fall in India's stock with her friends abroad is matched by the doubts that assail her own people. To misgivings about economic prospects have now been added a deep disquiet about the political future. The marked increase in tensions within Indian society, accelerated by intensified competition between the political parties since the general election in February 1967, raises fears that the consensus which has so far sustained the Indian experiment in democracy may break down. These fears, now at the center of the political debate within the country, testify to a crisis of confidence which is far more debilitating than the actual difficulties faced by India as a result of the loss of economic momentum and political coherence. But, paradoxically, the crisis is also a sign of hope. India has reasonably well- evolved political institutions and a fair leavening of educated public opinion, and these give her a sporting chance of pulling through. The practical solutions are still difficult to perceive, but the fact that all political elements are searching for them is itself reassuring.
Bruce Gilley ("In China's Own Eyes," September/October 2005) is correct that my biography, The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin, portrays Jiang as he might see himself. My intention (as stated in the book itself, on pages 691-92) was to move beyond all the hype and bias about China so as to understand how Chinese leaders think.
But Gilley's review is weighted with conspiracy theory. He asserts that "Jiang chose Kuhn," "a secret state propaganda team oversaw the writing of the book," and that I had a "Chinese collaborator."
The truth is almost the reverse.
The great hurrahs of the Cultural Revolution, the slogans, the messianic fervor, the public humiliation of the heretics are all gone. A visitor to Peking is impressed by nothing so much as by the return to normalcy, by pragmatism and-if one could imagine it in a Spartan land-a feeling of relaxation. Indeed, one might easily think that there had never been the awesome upheaval of 1966-69 "to change men's souls." Human frailty is once again understood, and there is at least an implied recognition that man does not live by faith alone.
