An American Skeptic In Europe

Meanwhile, as Newhouse sees it, the real challenge to the EU -- enlargement to the east -- has been neglected, not least because it creates major conflict among the Western Europeans. Taking in the Easterners will require, for example, the reform of America's old bugaboo, the Common Agricultural Policy -- not a task weak European governments are eager to undertake seriously. More fundamentally, Russia's retreat shifts Europe's center of political gravity from Paris to Bonn, or rather to Berlin. The EU's expansion eastward will confirm the shift by creating a large new bloc of German-oriented states. The union's vital Franco-German relationship is being upset as a result. A disgruntled, pessimistic France has already lost its self-confidence and can no longer play its traditional leading role as Germany's imaginative partner. Instead, Paris flirts ambiguously with the British, who continue to lack enthusiasm for a strong Europe. The Germans are as unhappy as the French. They cannot lead alone, since they lack a sufficient national ego and are frightened of having one.

Europe, meanwhile, according to Newhouse, grows more and more vulnerable to its increasingly unsafe surroundings. Newhouse believes Russia is more dangerous to the West now than during the Cold War. He also notes the long-term dangers of the "troubled Mediterranean," where the unhappiness of overpopulated and underdeveloped Muslim societies seems likely to boil over into Europe. In the south, as in the east, Europe is too divided for effective action. Northern European countries feel detached, and while Italy has the potential to be a great power in the region, jealousy between the Italians and the French precludes durable cooperation, and Italy continues to be more comfortable deriving its security from the Americans.

Europe, in short, has not found any effective new organizing principle to replace the Cold War. That principle, according to Newhouse, was supposed to have been federation. But today's Europe, its states at odds and increasingly challenged economically, is unlikely to become "a political entity capable of joint decision-making." Nevertheless, Newhouse feels, Europe's flaccid new order is essentially benign. The continent can and should remain "the citadel of civilized values, a center of peace and stability." But its equilibrium and safety will continue to depend on its close relationship with America. Newhouse worries whether that relationship can be sustained in the absence of a single clear and common threat. His unexceptionable advice is that transatlantic ties will have to be carefully cultivated.

AN UNTIDY CONFEDERACY

Newhouse's conclusions are intelligent and well-informed, but are they correct? Certainly the Soviet collapse has shaken up the comfortable Western Europeans, but their response has not been as inept as he portrays it. Monetary union may yet fail, but its prospects are better than Newhouse suggests -- not least because it is very much in Germany's interest. Since reunification, Germany has grown increasingly indebted and weighed down with its own Mezzogiorno, the former East Germany. Its national competitiveness is less assured, and a perennially overvalued deutsche mark risks becoming a poisoned heritage. Arguably, the sooner it is gotten rid of, the better for Germany and for Europe. A common currency will give new macroeconomic options to the Germans and Europeans collectively, as well as new financial power.

A successful EMU, moreover, will constitute a geoeconomic and to some extent geopolitical revolution. If it is achieved, no one will accuse Europe's leaders of lacking vision or determination. As it is, EMU has already elicited courageous political leadership in several European countries. The capacity of several successive French governments to hold fast to the franc fort hardly seems fickle or weak-willed. And the radical improvement in Italy's fiscal situation under the Romano Prodi government belies the stereotypes of Italian politics. EMU may be misguided, but it is hardly a sign of divided and indecisive leadership.

Newhouse is right to stress that Europe is at a delicate moment politically. But France is not as weak as he paints it, nor Germany as strong. Indeed, the current problem is not Germany's strength but its weakness. The Kohl government's economic reforms are blocked by the German states, the chancellor's authority is diminished, and the general direction of policy awaits next year's elections. In any event, Franco-German ties, which have held for half a century, are stronger than Newhouse indicates. Each country needs the other, and Europe's progress will continue to depend on their collaboration. Their partnership, moreover, does not require a centralized federal Europe. Such a Europe has never been a realistic option, and not achieving it should not be considered a failure.

Europe's abiding reality is that it is a Europe of states -- determined to preserve their independence but condemned to coordinate their policies. To reconcile these two imperatives, they have evolved toward a highly developed confederacy. It is an untidy construction, but also supple and tenacious. It is, in effect, a new and ingenious political formula for governing a diverse continent. It is certainly the most successful experiment in international cooperation in modern times. It is not very efficient, but then neither is America's own federal system. It can be expected to take a long time developing itself. Further integration will depend on the real need for it. Most likely, the states of the EU will do what their urgent interests require, and not much else.