Illiberal Illusions: Restoring Democracy's Good Name

DEMOCRACY FIRST

Charles A. Kupchan

Fareed Zakaria warns that the rise of "illiberal democracies" -- states that hold free elections but do not honor the rule of law and the rights of their citizens -- calls into question one of the core goals of American foreign policy: exporting democracy ("The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," November/December 1997). It is not democracy alone that makes states peaceful and benign, Zakaria contends, but liberal democracy. Without the protection of individual rights and the constraints on centralized power that accompany constitutional liberalism, democracy is prone to abuses of power and, especially in diverse societies, ethnic rivalry and conflict. Only when democratic governance evolves amid preexisting liberal protections does it lead to the oft-heralded "democratic peace." With half of the world's democracies illiberal, the spread of elections, far from producing a more harmonious world, is leading to increased instability. Zakaria counsels U.S. policymakers to end their fixation on ballot boxes and emphasize reviving constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Although on target in his observation that illiberal democracy is on the rise, Zakaria misses the mark in explaining why and in prescribing what to do about it. He misconstrues how liberal democracy evolves by relying too heavily on the Anglo-Saxon experience. Classical liberalism -- the notion that the individual's autonomy is sacrosanct -- was born and bred in Britain and the United States. When democracy -- narrowly defined as the selection of governments through free and fair elections -- took root in these countries, their political cultures, practices, and institutions were already imbued with the spirit of constitutional liberalism. Zakaria is right that liberalism preceded democracy -- but only in the Anglo-Saxon West.

The current wave of democratization is taking place in regions that have little or no experience in constitutional liberalism. Many countries in East Asia and the former Soviet bloc, for example, have a long history of paternalism and social norms that privilege the group over the individual. Without a tradition of liberal protection, the introduction of democracy is critical to instilling respect for individual rights and values of accountability and responsibility. Participatory democracy helps bring about the incremental changes in political culture necessary for liberal governance. Constitutional liberalism, after all, rests not just on formal institutions, but on the political attitudes and habits that bring them to life. Furthermore, the abuses of power that accompany illiberal democracy often create demand for the institutions and practices that check centralized power. In many of today's democratizing states, illiberal democracy may be a way station along the road to the more benign forms of governance that Zakaria justifiably prefers.

PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE

Zakaria attempts to rebut the claim that democracy can foster liberalism by arguing that "democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism," and that "to date few illiberal democracies have matured into liberal democracies." Not so. In fact, many of today's liberal democracies passed through lengthy illiberal periods. Germany had to make several passes at democracy before getting it right -- the Wilhelmine and inter-war variants were far from liberal. Even after the United States exported constitutional liberalism to Germany after World War II, it took time for it to take hold. Japan has long held democratic elections but has only recently strengthened multiparty governance, the quality and scope of public debate, and other attributes of liberal systems. A number of Latin American states have moved -- admittedly in fits and starts -- from illiberal to liberal democracy. Mexico, for example, has been democratic for decades, during which time its commitment to constitutional liberalism has gradually deepened. Democracy may produce adverse side effects during its early, transitional years, but over time it helps instill habits of transparency, tolerance, and accountability conducive to stable and liberal governance.

Zakaria's misconception that liberal democracy takes root only when constitutional liberalism precedes democratic rule leads him to misinterpret the political transformations now taking place in many parts of the world. East Asian states are relatively wealthy and stable, according to Zakaria, because they have followed the Western itinerary and moved from "autocracy to liberalizing autocracy, and, in some cases, toward liberalizing semi-democracy." Most East Asian states, however, are far more democratic than they are liberal. In Zakaria's own terms, constitutional liberalism "seeks to protect an individual's autonomy against coercion, whatever the source." But in making the case for East Asian liberalism, Zakaria points primarily to the existence of free markets, contract law, and property rights. East Asians might enjoy the wealth that has accompanied these economic freedoms as well as the moderating influence of a growing middle class, but they certainly do not enjoy the civil liberties commonly associated with liberal governance. Even in the economic realm, states assert control over the market -- one of the main causes of the recent financial crises in East Asia. Civic freedoms have of late been expanding, especially in South Korea and Taiwan. But democracy has served as a beachhead for liberal values and practices, not vice versa.

BUILDING GOOD HABITS