Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982
Military organizations change most durably and profoundly when they draw their leadership from new groups. This interesting sociological study by an active-duty colonel focuses on one such transformation. In the late 1940s bomber generals, such as the famous Curtis LeMay, dominated the U.S. Air force. By the 1980s fighter generals ran it. The credential of combat service in Vietnam helps account for this shift: far more fighter pilots went to war and came back with the prestige that comes with battle. But, Worden argues, technology (the rise of intercontinental ballistic missiles as competition for bombers) and a narrow doctrinal outlook, in particular, profound reluctance to think through the requirements of limited war, also crippled the bomber pilots' ability to lead. Today, bomber generals are not an endangered species, but there is no doubt who won the competition.
Related
The tools and techniques for waging war never stand still, but these are the early days of a revolution in military affairs as momentous as those wrought by the railroad and the airplane. This newest transformation is a consequence of developments in civilian society including the information revolution and postindustrial capitalism. Its satellite imagery and smart bombs will change the forms of combat and armies. Personnel and politics, as always, will be as crucial as technology.
The military technology which played such an important role in the US-led victory over Iraq was built and deployed during the 1980s, but "was largely conceived and developed during the 1970s". Explains and discusses the defence policy objectives and procurement priorities which launched this resurgence of US military technology -- the 'offset strategy', whose central concept was that of compensation for numerical inferiority through 'force multiplier' effects, chiefly in regard to C3I ('situational awareness'), defence suppression (EW) and precision guidance. The USA should take care not to nullify the offset strategy by wanton arms transfers.
Since it first emerged in 1997, avian influenza has become deadlier and more resilient. It has infected 109 people and killed 59 of them. If the virus becomes capable of human-to-human transmission and retains its extraordinary potency, humanity could face a pandemic unlike any ever witnessed.
