A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth
Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996) was bound to provoke strong reactions. But the degree of hostility and the amount of vituperation it has elicited from other scholars of the Holocaust and Nazi Germany has been surprising. The most shocking recent example is this book, which consists of two essays that try to show that the "Goldhagen thesis" about the German political culture of anti-Semitism that made it possible for so many "ordinary Germans" to carry out the extermination of the Jews is worthless. Three things are remarkable about this volume. First, both essays, in their hyperbolic overkill, repeatedly distort what Goldhagen has written and overlook and deny the quantity and quality of his sources. Finkelstein, who accuses Goldhagen quite misleadingly of providing a "monocausal explanation" and of diminishing the moral significance of the Holocaust, minimizes the plight of the Jews in Nazi Germany and concludes that Holocaust studies are an expression of Zionist ideology after the Six Day War, when American Jews were "basking . . . in Israel's reflected glory"! Second, this slim volume does not include Goldhagen's careful, detailed rebuttals of the authors' charges; the publisher thus chose to provide the public with a prosecutor's brief instead of presenting both sides of the argument. Third, this brief comes with endorsements by seven distinguished scholars, whose comments (for instance, about Goldhagen's alleged belief in "national characteristics") allow one to conclude that their dislike for his book affected their understanding of his arguments.
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Tony Judt is right to have doubts about the future of European union, but his jeremiad lacks an eye for detail.
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
Not much attention was paid in March 1985, when the European Council, whose members include the chiefs of state and government of the 12 member states, decided that it should constitute a single market by 1992. After all, the European Community had been established in 1957 with the goal of a common market, and many people believed that the goal had been reached; tariffs within the Community had been abolished, a common external tariff put in place and a controversial common agricultural policy instituted.

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