Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors
The Clinton administration's new coziness with China has left India feeling insecure, Taiwan betrayed, and Japan ignored.
Ted Galen Carpenter is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
In trying to defrost its chilly relationship with China, the Clinton administration has overshot the mark. Its rapprochement with Beijing has sent political tremors through East and South Asia. The increasingly cozy U.S.-Chinese relationship -- described by President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright in terms like "strategic cooperation" and "strategic partnership" -- has alarmed Taiwan, unsettled longtime U.S. allies Japan and South Korea, and prodded India to unveil its nuclear weapons program. Such reactions will have long-term repercussions for Washington's political and military roles in Asia.
INDIA ALIENATED
Attributing New Delhi's decision to conduct nuclear tests and move toward "weaponizing" its atomic program solely to the evolving U.S.-Chinese relationship is an oversimplification. The five-decade-old feud with Pakistan, as well as domestic politics, clearly played a role. Nevertheless, Indian officials and opinion leaders vehemently stressed not only the alleged security threat posed by China but Washington's apparent tilt toward Beijing. India's defense minister, George Fernandes, reacted bluntly to U.S. criticism of the tests. "I would ask Bill Clinton only one question. And it would be this: Why is it that you feel yourself so close to China that you can trust China with nuclear weapons ellipse but you cannot trust India?" The strategy editor of The Hindu newspaper reflected the same sense of irritation and betrayal: "We were being told to stay in a small box while the U.S. gave South Asia to China." Even a prominent critic of the tests, former Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, asked, "If you have decided that this side of Suez is an area of influence of China, what should an Indian policymaker do?"
American officials further alienated the Indian government by contemptuously dismissing protests about growing U.S.-Chinese ties. The scorn over Delhi's objections to Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin's joint declaration in June pledging cooperation to stem nuclear weapon and ballistic missile proliferation and promote peace and stability in South Asia was typical. The Indian government noted that it was "ironical that two countries that have directly and indirectly contributed to the unabated proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in our neighborhood are presuming to prescribe the norms for nonproliferation."
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The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.
As economic crisis plunges Asia into chaos, old wounds may reopen. The continent still fears Japan, thanks to its World War II brutalities. By refusing to apologize, Tokyo only makes matters worse. A power vacuum results: an unrepentant Japan will never be allowed to lead a suspicious Asia. Instead, flash points may ignite, and East Asia and even America could be dragged into a war. To defuse tensions, America must push its ally to show remorse and Japan must pay its World War II debts. In turn, China and Korea -- age-old enemies of Japan -- must learn to look forward, not back.
The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.
