The IMF, Now More than Ever: The Case for Financial Peacekeeping
Global economic chaos has made the International Monetary Fund a popular scapegoat, but the crisis shows just why the world needs a financial peacekeeper.
David D. Hale is the Global Chief Economist for the Zurich Group and a consultant to the Defense Department.
Would the world need an International Monetary Fund today if it did not already exist? As the outlook for the world economy becomes increasingly gloomy, the answer is an urgent yes. After Russia defaulted on its debt in mid-August, interest rates in emerging markets have skyrocketed so high that half of the world economy is courting recession next year. But precisely this turbulence in global financial markets demonstrates why the world needs the IMF: no other organization can serve as lender of last resort to buffer extreme economic turmoil during market stress.
The IMF failed to stem the Russian collapse not because its reform package was flawed but because Russia's domestic woes -- combined with its sensitivity to the global slump in oil and commodity prices -- were too severe to prevent market panic. Had the $22 billion IMF package for Russia been as large as its $40 billion bailout of Mexico in 1995, investors would probably not have fled. Instead, Russia's fiscal position was so delicate that investors decided $22 billion was not enough to guarantee success.
Beyond Russia, however, the IMF has successfully tempered the Asian financial crisis. Indeed, the fund's performance in Asia has highlighted the three roles it needs to play in today's economy. First, the IMF offers macroeconomic policy advice that politicians can sell to voters as their own; although the fund remains heavily influenced by the United States and other G-7 countries, it still offers a semblance of autonomy that makes its policy proposals more politically acceptable for borrowers. Second, the IMF acts as a global lender of last resort during a liquidity crunch, similar to the role played by national central banks during domestic banking crises. In this capacity, the fund can step in when market panic prevents a troubled economy from receiving necessary credit. Third, the IMF promotes microeconomic reforms that might otherwise be politically unacceptable. Such reforms have generally helped promote noninflationary economic growth.
RUSSIAN ROULETTE
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The global financial turmoil that began in Thailand in 1997 has forced the international community to reevaluate the institutions, structures, and policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution. In September 1998 President Clinton suggested that a distinguished private-sector group assess the need for reform of the international financial architecture. With this concern in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored the Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture, cochaired by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of both the Council and the Blackstone Group and secretary of commerce during the Nixon administration, and Carla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Co. and U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration.
Initially devised to maintain a system of fixed exchange rates, the IMF took on a new role during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s-providing moderate amounts of credit, facilitating debt renegotiations, and recommending responsible macroeconomic policies. But the IMF is also applying the lessons of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a fundamental economic restructuring was necessary, to Asia. So in Korea, for example, the fund called for reform of inefficient conglomerates and inflexible labor laws. However beneficial in the long run, such changes are not needed to resolve the current crisis. By stepping in too far and too soon, the IMF discourages countries from seeking modest help. Even worse, it encourages bankers to undertake more risky loans, making another crisis more likely.
The international financial community can assess its management of the international debt "crisis" of 1982-83 with a certain sense of satisfaction. Creative ad hoc solutions to individual countries' problems kept adequate credit flowing. Unpredecented cooperation among the International Monetary Fund (IMF), central banks, and private lenders restored confidence and prevented the "crisis" from playing out to a tragic conclusion--massive defaults, the freezing of new credit, bank failures, and perhaps ultimately a worldwide depression.

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