Fiddling in Rome: America and the International Criminal Court
U.S. negotiators at the International Criminal Court conference in Italy missed their chance. Washington cannot accept the court as is. Now what?
Ruth Wedgwood is a Professor of Law at Yale University and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The recent, brutal civil wars in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Congo make plain the need to prosecute amoral leaders who show no care for civilian lives. At least, this seemed the American position over the last four years as Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright touted the creation of the International Criminal Court as a key aim of American foreign policy. And yet in July 1998, when the draft treaty to create the ICC was approved in Rome, the United States found itself in a nasty minority, siding with Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Qatar against the court. (The final vote was 120 in favor, 7 opposed, and 21 abstentions.)
Some of Washington's concerns were serious and legitimate. American troops are deployed across the globe, and should not face the added danger of politically motivated prosecutions. But the administration failed to think through or effectively articulate its position on the court. Throughout the negotiations, wary of a skeptical Congress, the White House dithered. Though international meetings on the icc began in 1994, the United States failed to set its bottom line -- Would it back the court or not? Under what terms? -- until the president's return from China in early July. Only then, four weeks into the five-week U.N. final conference in Rome, were cabinet debates resolved and instructions issued to the American negotiating team. But by then it was too late for American diplomats to convince frustrated friends and allies to accommodate new U.S. demands -- a case study in how not to conduct multilateral diplomacy. A historic opportunity to shape the court in America's image was lost. Thanks to administration ambivalence and the failure of the United States to make its case to the world, what we got instead was a court America cannot agree to -- at least not until the court's good faith has been tested over time.
RESISTANCE TO U.S. LEADERSHIP
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"The unbridled assertion of collective rights, most often expressed as an aspiration to national self-determination, has become a major threat to global stability." U.S. foreign policymakers should emphasize individual human rights, which would release Washington from arbitrating conflicting national claims, consistent with America's own political traditions.
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.
NATO's poorly planned adventure in Kosovo has brought a critical question to the fore: just how should Americans define their national interest in the information age? The Soviet Union is gone, and an information revolution has transformed the nature of power. Few "A list" threats to American security loom large today. Global telecommunications have made humanitarian crises in far-flung places impossible to ignore. But before the United States embarks on another costly human rights crusade, Americans should recognize that moral values are only part of a foreign policy. Other essential priorities remain. If Washington neglects to handle the "A list," the consequences for global peace and prosperity will be dire.
