The Asian Values Ballyhoo: Patten's Common Sense on Hong Kong and Beyond

These electoral changes and other lesser reforms drove Beijing into a fit of rage, and Patten became the target of a memorably sustained, vituperative, and ad hominem propaganda campaign. Chinese officials called him a "whore," a "serpent," and a criminal to be "condemned for a thousand generations." (Sinologists were puzzled by the Chinese allegation that Patten was a "tango dancer," a supposedly dire insult, but Patten now clarifies the matter by reporting that he had once told Chinese negotiators that "it takes two to tango.") One major Chinese charge against Patten's electoral reforms was that he had violated a 1990 "secret agreement" between Douglas Hurd and Qian Qichen, Britain and China's respective foreign ministers. Patten writes that he was never briefed about the Hurd-Qian correspondence, only learned of it after Beijing's attacks on him, was certain he had not violated it, and, besides, could never get the Chinese to show him precisely where he had strayed.

Although Patten received stout backing from his masters in London, he was constantly assailed by OCHs who argued that, instead of trying to protect democracy, British policy should aim at "convergence" with China's plans for post-reversion Hong Kong. They called for a "through train" approach so that the turnover would cause a minimum of shock, which might adversely affect business. Patten was never impressed by the argument that China policy should be held hostage to the wishes of business. On the contrary, he felt that while Beijing might threaten to play off Western companies and governments against each other, little would be lost and much gained by sticking to political principle. Indeed, Patten recognized early on something that has seemingly escaped the notice of the State Department and the White House: most businesses that claim that their interests are being hurt by Western diplomacy toward China really have only themselves to blame for their difficulties with the Chinese. Their cries about misguided state policy are just alibis for their own failures. Patten notices, moreover, that American trade with China went up when U.S.-China relations seemed to be in trouble, while Germany, which strove to cultivate Europe's best relationship with China, saw its strenuous efforts result in a slight drop in its share of the China market, from 13 percent in 1986 to 12 percent a decade later. France, which weathered all manner of Chinese propaganda attacks for selling weapons to Taiwan, had almost exactly the same drop in market share as Germany. Patten also points out that during his period as governor, for all the Chinese fury against him and his country's policies, British trade with China doubled. Still, the message seems not to have gotten through. Even after leaving Hong Kong, Patten has been plagued by the timorous; Rupert Murdoch, apparently concerned that Beijing might not take kindly to Patten's book and apprehensive about his financial interests in China, compelled HarperCollins to cancel its contract with Patten.

NOT SCARED WITLESS

Patten's approach to China is premised on the dangers of allowing greedy fantasies like Murdoch's to obscure cold realities. He reminds us that Britain sells over nine times as much to Belgium and Luxembourg as to China and three times as much to Australia. America sells about the same amount to these countries as to China. Patten is also guided by the basic fact that Asia's share of total world output was greater at the beginning of the century, when agriculture was still king, than at the height of its recent "miracle" growth period. Even with highly optimistic assumptions that discount the severity of the current crisis, Asia will not regain the share of the world's output that it had in 1900 until the end of the first decade of the 21st century.

Patten starts, therefore, by confessing that he is "not scared witless of the People's Republic of China or mesmerized by China's might and majesty." He finds it easy to punch holes in the logic and factual bases of both the advocates of engagement and containment -- between what he calls "ring-around-a-rosy diplomacy and the ring-of-steel school." Patten is just as tough on those who would have the West walk on eggs rather than offend Chinese sensibilities or prejudices as he is on those who want the West to prepare for a "coming conflict with China." Advocates of the "tread gently" school have spun for themselves elaborate but unsubstantiated theories about what it takes to inflate or deflate the Chinese ego, while those who cry that "the Chinese juggernaut is coming" fail to appreciate that the long history of China's ever-impending emergence as a world-shaker is a premier example of Murphy's Law in operation.

Patten counsels the West to be guided by common sense and a respect for its principles. This entails treating China with the same respect and dignity afforded any sovereign country. China's particular problems should be acknowledged, but at the same time Western abhorrence of China's human rights record should not be muted. Even so, Patten's call for evenhandedness comes across as somewhat hard-line and anti-Chinese, his intentions notwithstanding.

ASIAN (DE)VALUES