Many economists hate to admit it, but today's economic turmoil shares some uncanny -- or downright scary -- similarities with the prelude to the Great Depression. Many policymakers seem to have unlearned the basic lesson of that calamity: boost demand in the face of an economic slowdown and reduce the volatility of capital flows. Rigid adherence to anti-inflationary policies will only deepen the crises in emerging markets. As the IMF continues to insist on fiscal austerity and many governments instinctively resist capital controls, a wider recession looms. With a distinct whiff of the 1930s in the air, we had better refresh our memories and relearn the basics of Depression economics.
Paul Krugman is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His most recent book is The Accidental Theorist.
A WHIFF OF THE 1930S
In the spring of 1931 Austria's largest bank, the Credit Anstalt, was on the verge of collapse. The Austrian government could not simply stand by and let it fail, but when it came to the bank's rescue with large sums of freshly printed domestic currency, the resulting capital flight rapidly depleted Austria's gold and foreign exchange reserves. The obvious answer would have been to abandon the gold standard and let the currency float. But this solution was unacceptable -- not just because a drop in the schilling's value would magnify the burden of foreign-currency-denominated debt, but because a currency devaluation would deal a devastating blow to the confidence of a country whose memories of post-World War I hyperinflation were still fresh. Austria pleaded for help from its neighbors and the then-new Bank for International Settlements, but the offered assistance was too little, too late. In the end, the desperate government resorted to capital controls.
It is a familiar story to economic historians. It is also astonishingly modern-sounding: if the plot does not exactly fit any one of today's crisis-ridden economies around the world, it does sound very much like a pastiche of recent events in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brazil. The main difference now is that financial rescue attempts from the international community have become routine. When a country gets in trouble today a swat team from the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury quickly arrives on the scene. Suppose, however, that the IMF could use a time machine to send its best money doctors back to that Vienna spring of 1931, but without the ability to offer a huge, no-questions-asked credit line on the spot. What would today's experts say? What could they tell the Austrians that they did not already know?1
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The peso may collapse and Barings fail, but financial markets sail along, confirming the success of international regulatory efforts begun in the 1970s.
Since its creation, the IMF has seen its global mission overcome by floating exchange rates and immense private capital markets. Consequently, it has focused more on the developing world, become more politicized, and wandered into riskier endeavors such as Mexico's bailout. Nevertheless, the IMF can and should be reformed to become a global rating agency, a bankruptcy judge for nations, and an international catalyst for aid and financial packages.
Attempting to prevent future financial crises by drafting new global regulations will do more harm than good. If governments adopt the same regulations, they will make the same mistakes. Instead, financial regulation must be the task of individual governments and not multilateral committees.

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