A Self-Help Guide for Emerging Markets
The global financial crisis of 1997-98 was neither the first of its kind nor the last. But this time, even the virtuous were not immune. The stricken countries desperately need a plan for protection in the future. The IMF is too strapped and its program too flawed to serve as an effective international lender of last resort. Instead, emerging markets must learn to inoculate themselves against future currency attacks by increasing liquidity, such as foreign currency reserves, so they can fight back the powerful forces of market speculation on their own. While self-help is expensive, it is far less painful than the turmoil of currency crises. Emerging markets must take their fate into their own hands.
Martin Feldstein is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
FIGHTING THE ASIAN FLU
Like death and taxes, international economic crises cannot be avoided. They will continue to occur as they have for centuries past. But the alarmingly rapid spread of the 1997 Asian crisis showed how shifting perceptions alone can disrupt even fundamentally stable countries. In the wake of Russia's default, skyrocketing interest rates in emerging markets underlined these economies' vulnerability to investor skittishness. Unfortunately, there is no international "911" that emerging markets can dial when facing economic collapse. Neither the International Monetary Fund (IMF) nor a new global financial architecture will make the world less dangerous. Instead, countries that want to avoid a devastating rerun of the 1997-98 crisis must learn to protect themselves. And self-protection requires more than avoiding bad policies that make a currency crisis inevitable, for the threat of contagion makes even the virtuous vulnerable to currency runs.
Liquidity is the key to financial self-help. A country that has substantial international liquidity -- large foreign currency reserves and a ready source of foreign currency loans -- is less likely to be the object of a currency attack. Substantial liquidity also enables a country already under a speculative siege to defend itself better and make more orderly financial adjustments. The challenge is to find ways to increase liquidity at reasonable cost.
The need for enhanced liquidity stems from the inevitable absence of an international lender of last resort -- a dependable source of credit when a country needs additional foreign currency. This is not the case within a national economy, where the central bank provides liquidity to the banking system. A solvent commercial bank -- one with assets that exceed its liabilities -- does not have enough liquid assets to pay depositors if they were all to demand their funds at once. But a central bank can prevent a run of depositors on the bank by following the advice provided more than a century ago by British economist Walter Bagehot: to lend "freely, at penalty interest rates, on appropriate collateral."
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Initially devised to maintain a system of fixed exchange rates, the IMF took on a new role during the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s-providing moderate amounts of credit, facilitating debt renegotiations, and recommending responsible macroeconomic policies. But the IMF is also applying the lessons of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a fundamental economic restructuring was necessary, to Asia. So in Korea, for example, the fund called for reform of inefficient conglomerates and inflexible labor laws. However beneficial in the long run, such changes are not needed to resolve the current crisis. By stepping in too far and too soon, the IMF discourages countries from seeking modest help. Even worse, it encourages bankers to undertake more risky loans, making another crisis more likely.
The global financial crisis has eroded developing nations' faith in modern capitalism itself, and the meltdown of Brazil's currency was grim evidence that the chaos is far from over. But few lessons have been absorbed. That had better change. Key Wall Street and Washington players do agree that crisis management was muffed, the nature of contagion misunderstood, and the importance of local politics underestimated. But they argue over the pace of fiscal liberalization, the efficacy of the IMF rescues, and the importance of "moral hazard." Herewith, a politically realistic plan to bridge the gaps and gird for the next, inevitable disaster.
Global economic chaos has made the International Monetary Fund a popular scapegoat, but the crisis shows just why the world needs a financial peacekeeper.

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