The Rebirth of Europe; Europe's Franco-German Engine
A shrewd observer of Germany and eastern Europe, Pond has presented an informative overview of European affairs since 1989. Along with discussing Poland's strained relationship with its eastern neighbors, she provides an eminently readable account of European economic and monetary union (emu), European Union enlargement, EU relations with America, and the French-German-British triad. Without hyperbole, she argues that the EU has been a success story and that emu will energize Europe. She also criticizes America's reluctance to acknowledge EU achievements, especially in emu and diplomatic and security matters, cautioning that the "U.S. still tends to want to establish rules of international law that will bind others, but not itself." Although mindful of continuing transatlantic tensions, she concludes with a plea for cooperation.
The volume edited by Calleo and Staal examines the French-German "couple" whose often difficult yet remarkably resilient partnership has provided European integration with its engine, a vital fact underestimated by the United States. The authors -- officials and academics from both sides -- agree on EMU's importance to the partnership's future. Although most essays express optimism, German professor Michael StŸrmer takes the more skeptical view that "the eu's imbalance between economic strength and political weakness" is permanent -- and advantageous to the United States. Meanwhile, Patrick McCarthy's final chapter provides a good short history of the "Franco-German axis" from 1958 until 1997. Since then, of course, new conflict has erupted in areas such as agriculture and regional subsidies, and in last year's wrangle over the head of the European Central Bank. The two socialist parties in power pursue policies that are both at odds with each other and sometimes incoherent. All the same, this book reminds us that compelling reasons for compromise and cooperation remain.
Related
Tony Judt is right to have doubts about the future of European union, but his jeremiad lacks an eye for detail.
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
Not much attention was paid in March 1985, when the European Council, whose members include the chiefs of state and government of the 12 member states, decided that it should constitute a single market by 1992. After all, the European Community had been established in 1957 with the goal of a common market, and many people believed that the goal had been reached; tariffs within the Community had been abolished, a common external tariff put in place and a controversial common agricultural policy instituted.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.