Terms of Engagement; Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe Is Unable to Act in International Politics; Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy
After the optimists come the therapists. These new books address the gap between the EU's economic power and its diplomatic impotence. One alternative therapy is offered by Brenner, who examines the perennially touchy U.S.-European security relationship and points out that Washington has always been reluctant to allow a common EU position, within or outside of NATO, before consultation with the United States. Meanwhile, the Europeans remain divided over how far to go. To get beyond this impasse, the new "terms of engagement" that Brenner seeks would entail in the short term regular dialogue, coordinated diplomatic action, and reliance on NATO when military action is needed. At the same time, for the long run the Europeans must create a military force allowing them to act without waiting for America. Alas, these prudent and sensible proposals are not likely to satisfy those Europeans who want to go beyond "Atlanticism."
It might, however, satisfy Zielonka, who aims at rehabilitating the idea of the EU as a "civilian power." In both of his volumes, he pleads for institutional reforms that would permit a genuine European foreign policy while leaving security matters to NATO. He explores the domestic and institutional causes of collective impotence and suggests "decentralizing" and "socializing" foreign policies that would reduce the EU to a "forum for expressing grassroots initiatives" and treat international affairs as "social work," not power politics. This view may reflect opinion in the smaller EU states, but certainly not the major ones. And Zielonka underestimates the continuing importance of strategic questions in world politics. In the edited volume, however, he receives some support for his views from France's Jean-Marie Guehenno and the overheated Atlanticism of Charles Kupchan.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
Not much attention was paid in March 1985, when the European Council, whose members include the chiefs of state and government of the 12 member states, decided that it should constitute a single market by 1992. After all, the European Community had been established in 1957 with the goal of a common market, and many people believed that the goal had been reached; tariffs within the Community had been abolished, a common external tariff put in place and a controversial common agricultural policy instituted.
France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, is often charged with being anti-American. As his new book shows, however, his brand of realist diplomacy is more subtle and pragmatic than his American critics see it.
