Thawing Korea's Cold War: The Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea is ailing. For the first time in 40 years, there is real hope for reconciliation with the South. Pyongyang should be engaged -- but cautiously.
Hong Soon-young is Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Republic of Korea. He is a former Ambassador to the Russian Federation and to Germany.
The half-century-long standoff between democratic South Korea and the communist North has recently thawed, become fluid and dynamic. Though many challenges to peace and reunification remain, measured and hopeful changes are taking place in Pyongyang. In the past few years, the world has witnessed North Korea's drastic economic deterioration. The heart-wrenching plight of hungry and starving North Korean children has drawn international humanitarian aid to the beleaguered regime. Meanwhile, clearly anxious to earn critical foreign capital, Pyongyang has allowed expanded trade with the South. North Korea has been compelled -- however reluctantly, however slowly -- to open up to its Southern brethren and the international community.
Therein lie Seoul's hopes for tension reduction, peace, and reunification. The engagement policies of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung are tooled to pursue these ends by nurturing positive changes in the North and encouraging fundamental reform there. While there has been much speculation about North Korean collapse in recent years, it is unlikely to come anytime soon. The communists' airtight grip on all manner of social, economic, political, and military affairs has so far ensured their stability and may well continue to do so. Meanwhile, South Korea does not seek the North's collapse and has officially proclaimed this position; a breakdown in the North could open up military, political, and humanitarian pitfalls. It is therefore simply too dangerous to count on the North's collapse as the key to the nation's future. South Korea aims to achieve peace and reunification methodically and gradually instead. This will take time -- perhaps a long time -- but it will be worth the wait. And it is the only viable course to pursue.
SURVIVAL GAMES
No one thinks that peace will come easily to Korea. The road to reconciliation is a difficult one, made even more arduous by the North's propensity for brinkmanship. Pyongyang acts with apparent disregard for global public opinion and the consequences of its defiant foreign policy on its people, and always seems intent on testing the patience and nerve of other states. With Seoul and its allies having to constantly guess the real intentions of the heavily armed and inscrutable communist regime, the Korean peninsula remains a major flash point of the post-Cold War era...
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