NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia with high hopes that the transatlantic relationship would find new purpose through robust humanitarian intervention. Alas, Milosevic remains as entrenched as ever. A messy diplomatic compromise is increasingly likely, but anything less than total victory will have grave consequences for America and its allies. Europe will be wary of cooperating with the United States on security and balk at future engagements that lack U.N. blessing. U.S. isolationists will get plenty more grist for their mill. With its expectations set far too high, NATO will pay the price when they come crashing back to earth.
Peter W. Rodman, a former White House and State Department official, is Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center and author of the recent monograph Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Contrary to many fears, Kosovo did not ruin the North Atlantic Alliance's 50th anniversary celebration in Washington last April after all. On the contrary, the solidarity that all the allies felt compelled to demonstrate amid the crisis may have helped them paper over their numerous differences over NATO's mission and procedures in a new era. The summit's agreement on an updated "Strategic Concept" for the alliance was a significant achievement. But anything less than success in the Kosovo crisis will undermine this unity -- an outcome that now seems likely.
The allies began the war with high expectations. The center-left governments in office in key allied countries stressed the moral imperatives of reversing ethnic cleansing and saving the people of Kosovo. Under attack from political forces on the far left (and, in France, from the right) for collaborating with the hated Americans, these leaders have defended their solidarity with NATO through moral argument. The war must "prevent a humanitarian catastrophe," German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder insisted. But if the crisis ends in an ambiguous diplomatic compromise with Slobodan Milosevic, the disillusionment may be sharp and the political reverberations intense. NATO's unity of purpose in entering the war will not preclude transatlantic finger-pointing and recriminations if the outcome does not live up to the high standard that was set. The strategic stake for the alliance has become enormous.
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The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
In Waging Modern War, General Wesley Clark describes how NATO bested Serbia -- just barely -- in the organization's first-ever shooting war. With confused priorities, a reluctant military, and overweening lawyers, the alliance was scarcely up to the task.
After NATO's air strikes against Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Liberation Army is girding for a long guerrilla war to win an independent Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later. To Washington's consternation, the KLA radicals have supplanted moderate Kosovar leaders and won the support of most of the Serbian province's ethnic Albanians. The West is still wedded to autonomy for Kosovo, but Serbian brutality has left the KLA bent on outright secession. So we had better get to know the KLA -- both because it is not going to go away and because it is likely to win.
