Winning the long showdown with Moscow was an amazing governmental achievement -- whose underpinnings are now at risk. The key to victory was an institutional framework that ably managed defense resources to procure weapons, prepare for a long standoff, and mobilize political support for the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, America innovatively melded public and private efforts to make new arms systems, use interservice rivalries as a goad to innovation, and draw on U.S. technological expertise. But foolishly, all these institutions are being dismantled in the post-Cold War era.
Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and Organization at MIT. Eugene Gholz is Instructor in the Institute of Public Policy at George Mason University. Allen Kaufman is Professor of Management at the University of New Hampshire.
RISKING THE INSTITUTIONS OF VICTORY
No one knows what security challenges the United States will face in the next century. To meet the challenges of the Cold War -- America's longest and most complex struggle -- the United States created a set of institutions and societal relationships that let it prevail without sacrificing its way of life. As the new century approaches, those very institutions and relationships are at risk.
Many now believe that because of America's towering technological advantages, which were displayed so effectively in the 1991 confrontation with Iraq, no enemy will dare oppose U.S. forces with conventional weapons. Instead, future attacks will likely be "asymmetric," involving terrorism, sabotaging U.S. communications and financial systems, and poisoning cities' water supplies. Such assaults cannot defeat the United States but may cause panic and make appeasement tempting.
The interest in asymmetric threats reflects not only an awareness of the United States' relative strength but also a recognition that victory in war can stem from the ability to surprise as well as from the exercise of power. During the Cold War, the U.S. national security system overcame many more symmetrical than asymmetrical surprises. The Soviets' first nuclear tests, the invasion of South Korea, the Chinese entry into the Korean War, Sputnik, and the downing of Gary Powers' u-2 spy plane -- to name just a few -- were all symmetrical actions, but surprises nonetheless. America's sustained ability to meet all types of challenges and to generate some surprises of its own was obviously important to its Cold War triumph. This ability will be no less important to America's future security, which makes the rush to dismantle the institutional framework that underlay the Cold War victory so foolishly dangerous.
For many policymakers, the answer to these and any other security threats is technology and more technology -- an especially appealing prospect because the relevant technologies are being developed rapidly by thriving commercial markets without special government attention. U.S. military actions, in this view, will be executed remotely and precisely, for the most part avoiding casualties among U.S. forces and the innocent. High-tech advocates also argue that precision strikes will avert the need to mobilize U.S. society to any significant extent.
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Despite a vast budget that dwarfs the military spending power of both friends and foes, the U.S. military today remains stuck in the past. American strategy still relies on a Cold War-era view of the world, and U.S. technology is ill-suited to current missions. Meanwhile, demoralization is creeping through the ranks. The next president must seize the opportunity to remake the military by forcing it to focus on the missions of the future rather than those of the past. The alternative -- more of the same -- is too dangerous to consider.
The military technology which played such an important role in the US-led victory over Iraq was built and deployed during the 1980s, but "was largely conceived and developed during the 1970s". Explains and discusses the defence policy objectives and procurement priorities which launched this resurgence of US military technology -- the 'offset strategy', whose central concept was that of compensation for numerical inferiority through 'force multiplier' effects, chiefly in regard to C3I ('situational awareness'), defence suppression (EW) and precision guidance. The USA should take care not to nullify the offset strategy by wanton arms transfers.
The risk of a catastrophic exchange of nuclear missiles has receded. Yet the chances of some use of weapons of mass destruction have risen. Chemical weapons are a lesser threat, but more likely. A vial of anthrax dispersed over Washington could kill as many as three million. Traditional deterrence will not stop a disgruntled group with no identifiable address from striking out at America. The United States must pull back from excessive foreign involvements and begin a program of civil defense to reduce casualties in the event the unthinkable happens.
