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The Future of the International Financial Architecture

By Peter G. Peterson and Carla A. Hills
November/December 1999
Article Summary and Author Biography

The global financial turmoil that began in Thailand in 1997 has forced the international community to reevaluate the institutions, structures, and policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution. In September 1998 President Clinton suggested that a distinguished private-sector group assess the need for reform of the international financial architecture. With this concern in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored the Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture, cochaired by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of both the Council and the Blackstone Group and secretary of commerce during the Nixon administration, and Carla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Co. and U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration.

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THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force

The global financial turmoil that began in Thailand in 1997 has forced the international community to reevaluate the institutions, structures, and policies aimed at crisis prevention and resolution. In September 1998 President Clinton suggested that a distinguished private-sector group assess the need for reform of the international financial architecture. With this concern in mind, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored the Independent Task Force on the Future of the International Financial Architecture, cochaired by Peter G. Peterson, chairman of both the Council and the Blackstone Group and secretary of commerce during the Nixon administration, and Carla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Co. and U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration.

Morris Goldstein, former deputy director of research at the International Monetary Fund and now a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics, served as project director and author of the report. Task force members are listed on page 171.

The following is an edited executive summary of the task force report. A full-length version of the report and dissents can be found on the Council on Foreign Relations Web site, at www.cfr.org.

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