The Road From Serfdom: Amartya Sen Argues that Growth Is Not Enough

Sen also examines three philosophical traditions that have laid claim to the proper basis for social justice. First is utilitarianism, going back to Jeremy Bentham, with its emphasis on maximizing the total "utility" of a community by achieving "the greatest good for the greatest number." The second school is libertarianism, which emphasizes both the natural and the inherited rights of all individual members of the community and holds them as inviolable (except insofar as they must be limited to protect the rights of others). Finally, there is the "maximin" principle, as proposed by the Harvard philosopher John Rawls, which insists on choosing those social arrangements that maximize the well-being of the poorest member of a community, subject to the preservation of liberty.

Sen's training as an economist serves him well here. He argues that each perspective holds merit, but that if pushed to the extreme each also can lead to results that defy commonsense justice; for example, if a village's utility is maximized by tormenting its ugliest, or dumbest, or most eccentric member; or if Rawls' scheme involves a great reduction in the material well-being of large numbers of people compared with an alternative that leaves the poorest not quite so well off; or if the uncompromising pursuit of liberty has grotesque consequences. Compromises must sometimes be made among perfectly valid but sometimes conflicting perspectives. These tradeoffs and moral decisions, Sen argues, should be exposed to public debate, should use fully available information, and should resolve each particular case in some democratic way.

SEN AND SENSIBILITY

Sen is a genuine world citizen. Implicit throughout his book is the notion that all humanity is connected and that human suffering anywhere holds relevance everywhere. Given the strong sense of social justice that he espouses, however, he does not address some hard practical questions. How should, say, wealthy Bostonians allocate their energies and resources among their relatively deprived inner-city neighbors, the indigent and often poorly educated agricultural workers in California and Texas, and the seriously malnourished and undereducated peoples of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa? Each person cannot carry a burden of responsibility for every ill, missed opportunity, or obvious injustice. To which relevant "community" should people chiefly belong, and which one should command the most attention? Whatever answer one chooses holds profound implications both for the private activities of individuals and for the foreign policies of the United States and other well-off countries. Sen offers no help here.

Sen's position does, however, have a great deal to offer to groups -- nongovernmental organizations, national foreign-aid agencies, and international organizations -- that promote economic development. He argues strongly and convincingly that economists' post-1950 focus on economic growth alone has been far too narrow. Moreover, everyone knows that the record of accomplishment of foreign assistance is spotty at best, even when focused narrowly on raising material well-being. As the record suggests, foreign assistance promotes development only if the recipient pursues appropriate macroeconomic and pricing policies and, above all, genuinely and enthusiastically embraces development objectives.

Even though Sen is a philosopher-economist, not a practicing politician, he is intensely interested in the real world of human well-being. As such, he must be aware of the practical implications of his general thesis. He does not expand on them for his readers; the main thesis is subversive enough. But what might some of these implications entail? Sen would greatly applaud, for example, the explicit emphasis in recent years on public health and primary and secondary schooling. Indeed, he would go much further and take on authoritarianism and serious discrimination against women wherever they exist, encouraging leaders to reduce political and civil repression and to promote public discussion about government decisions. In this respect, Sen implicitly attacks the grand bargain built into the post-1945 system of the United Nations: external aggression anywhere is a matter for legitimate global concern and potential action, but internal matters are left entirely to member states, except possibly in cases of extreme violations of human rights.

It is noteworthy that Sen presumes throughout his discussion a peaceful and stable society in which his framework can operate -- having in mind, perhaps, his native India, from which he draws many illustrations. But he fails to note that many poor countries are either not peaceful and stable or are stable only because political or civil freedoms have been suppressed. Although he does not emphasize it, Sen's analysis includes among the primary freedoms such stability: the security of the individual against physical assault or depredation, necessary for developing human capabilities to enjoy the kinds of life that are valued. A well-ordered society assures physical security for its residents from both internal and external threats. But actual and potential conflicts abound. During periods of turmoil, freedoms are often suppressed in the name of stability.