Day of Deceit: The Truth About F.D.R.and Pearl Harbor
Stinnett revives another old argument: that Roosevelt knew about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and let it happen. (Even Buchanan did not stoop to this old saw.) A persistent digger, Stinnett has uncovered some nuggets of new evidence, but his most sensational items are premised on the false belief that American intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code before the attack. In fact, it was not decrypted until after Pearl Harbor. Aside from questioning the competence and honesty of two officers in U.S. naval intelligence (in a case concerning the Japanese fleet's radio silence and U.S. radio direction-finding), the book offers little new. Stinnett never fashions his nuggets of research into a coherent argument, much less a convincing portrait. It is odd that an otherwise respectable publisher did not insist on such coherence before peddling this book with its sensational press release. If Roosevelt was indeed maneuvering to have a war forced on the United States, his maneuvers were aimed at Germany rather than Japan, which he and Churchill simply hoped to deter. Pearl Harbor demonstrated their misjudgments, not their shrewdness.
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Fifty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, America should ask itself why Japanese civilians became targets during World War II. Recently declassified documents suggest that Tokyo probably would have surrendered without the bombings or an Allied invasion of Japan. In the moral climate of 1945, however, there were few dissenters. "When you have to deal with a beast," Truman wrote, "you have to treat him as a beast."
As economic crisis plunges Asia into chaos, old wounds may reopen. The continent still fears Japan, thanks to its World War II brutalities. By refusing to apologize, Tokyo only makes matters worse. A power vacuum results: an unrepentant Japan will never be allowed to lead a suspicious Asia. Instead, flash points may ignite, and East Asia and even America could be dragged into a war. To defuse tensions, America must push its ally to show remorse and Japan must pay its World War II debts. In turn, China and Korea -- age-old enemies of Japan -- must learn to look forward, not back.
The periodic successes enjoyed by US cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese PURPLE code could have made no contribution to advance warning of the Japanese attack, as PURPLE was used strictly for diplomatic, not military, communications. The attack was a deep shock to US intelligence, and "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better".

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