India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation
An extraordinary and perhaps definitive account of 50 years of Indian nuclear policymaking. For all of Nehru's moralizing about the bomb's evils, Perkovich writes, he started India down the nuclear road when he founded the Indian Atomic Research Center. Indian scientists soon became a self-motivated force for the bomb, while the West's arguments for nonproliferation only stimulated India's desire to become a nuclear power. Perkovich shows that the Indian decision to build the bomb did not respond to external security threats but to the domestic Indian need to assert its national identity, break from its colonial legacy, and become the great power that it felt it should rightfully be -- a complex mix of domestic and psychological factors. Although the study tells more about domestic Indian affairs than most international relations generalists will want, it should be taken seriously by all concerned with proliferation. With painful clarity, it exposes the false illusions that have limited the effectiveness of proliferation opponents.
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Since independence, India's nuclear policy has been to seek either global disarm ament or equal security for all. The old nonproliferation regime was discriminatory, ratifying the possession of nuclear weapons for the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while preaching to the nuclear have-nots about the virtues of disarmament. India was left sandwiched between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and a rising China. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade trump old-fashioned security woes. If nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?
Last year's nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan brought world attention to the decades-old Kashmir conflict. Claimed by both countries, the former princely state has been ravaged by a war that shows no sign of ending. Both rivals have invested heavily in blood and treasure to make Kashmir their own. Now Afghan-trained mujahideen are leading the fight, bringing their own foreign brand of radical Islam. Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has ever asked what Kashmiris want. They would not like the answer: more than anything else, Kashmiris hope to be left alone.
India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests last May were a double setback: for security on the subcontinent and worldwide nonproliferation efforts. U.S. attempts to forge warmer relations with both countries were also casualties of the blasts. The tests could spark a chain of withdrawals from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, undermining the international consensus against the spread of nuclear arms. Cold War brinkmanship is no model for diplomacy. For their sake as well as the world's, India and Pakistan need to stabilize their nuclear rivalry at the lowest possible level, ban further tests, and embrace frequent, high-level bilateral talks to ease tensions.
