Italy's entry into Europe's single currency was a triumph of fiscal displine over a long history of profligate spending. But Italy's embrace of European institutions is driven by more than just economics. "Europe" has helped Italy cement its national identity, clean up its politics, and modernize its laws. Although the European Union will never replace Italians' regional or national allegiances, it will always find its staunchest supporters in Rome rather than in Paris, Brussels, or Berlin.
G. Frederico Mancini, who planned to deliver this essay as the Robert Schuman Lecture at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, died last July. He had been the Italian judge at the European Court of Justice since 1988, taught at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and was Professor of Law at the University of Bologna. It is Foreign Affairs' honor to run this essay in his memory.
THE ITALIAN MIRACLE
Now that the euro has been launched, it is a good moment to step back and remember just how European economic and monetary union (EMU) came into being. Fearing that German reunification would jeopardize the "Rhenish" balance on which Europe had rested until then, French President Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided in 1990 that the only credible guarantee of an ongoing German allegiance to European unity would be the immolation of the deutsche mark -- and with it the almost totemic reverence it elicited from the citizens of the Federal Republic -- on the altar of a common European currency. To this effect, a committee chaired by the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, unearthed a long-forgotten report drafted in the early 1970s by the prime minister of Luxembourg and made the recommendations ultimately leading to the adoption of EMU in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. It was a laborious compromise that the central bankers, with the German Bundesbank in the vanguard, did not welcome at all. They eventually resigned themselves to it, but only on one condition: the crossbar that EMU candidates needed to vault would be set so high that it would be inaccessible to those not blessed with a strong and stable currency. Thus EMU was effectively conceived as a dress made to measure for a hard core of virtuous states: Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. But it was precisely the crossbar's prohibitive height that made the countries doomed to exclusion aware of the depth of the pit in which they would be left to vegetate -- and prompted them to make extraordinary efforts to drag themselves out.
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The awesome floods of November aside, Italy in late 1966 was in a state of non-crisis. There has been enough political and economic instability in the past, however, to make us view this period of often frenetic progress toward industrialization and social unity as temporary. Fundamental social changes are in process. The business recession of 1964 seems a thing of the past. A government budget of $14.3 billion for 1967 has been prepared, including $1.4 billion for much-needed agricultural development during the next five years and another $600 million for the still depressed southern regions. After hesitant beginnings in February, the third coalition center- left government of the taciturn Christian Democratic premier, Aldo Moro, appears to be settling in with a minimum of open controversy for the period between now and the general elections in 1968. The strains among the basically mismated members of his cabinet are temporarily eased while the two major elements (Christian Democrats and Socialists) reform for the campaign to win the adherence of more than 32,000,000 voters. In foreign policy, reflecting as it does the gentler phase of the cold war, no initiatives are likely. None the less, there is much for Italy's politicians to do.
"Wer von Europa spricht, hat unrecht," Bismarck said: "Whoever speaks of Europe is wrong." After reading a great deal of what has been written about Europe, one is tempted to agree with the old statesman. It has become increasingly difficult to get one's bearings. Are pro-Europeans for or against the Americans? For or against the Russians? For or against other Europeans? Can one find clear answers to these questions?
A Still-European Union
Wolfgang Schauble
David Phillips is right to argue that "Turkey is a crucial ally for the West" ("Turkey's Dreams of Accession," September/October 2004) but wrong to claim that only full membership in the EU will preserve that relationship.
