The Philippine War, 1899-1902
Narrative military history today is an art as despised as it is infrequently practiced. But in the hands of a first-rate scholar, it is something very fine indeed. It may take a full century to gain critical distance from a war as controversial as the Philippine campaign, but Linn has produced a solid account of America's first modern counterinsurgency effort. He concludes that the war's lopsided outcome reflected not a triumph of racist brutality (as many scholars see it) but a combination of the insurgents' arrogance and incompetence -- and a remarkable level of military sophistication and effectiveness in the American forces. He does not skimp on the horrors of war, nor does he dismiss the patriotism of Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipinos who fought the Americans. At the same time, he does not pander to a reflexive anticolonialist orthodoxy. A thoughtful, deeply researched, and well-written work about a war that teaches much about the nature of revolutionary warfare -- even today.
Related
Max Boot tells only half the story; U.S. small wars did not look that small to the losers.
The Federation of Malaysia is scheduled to come into existence on August 31 of this year by the merger of the existing Federation of Malaya with Singapore, the British colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo and the British- protected Sultanate of Brunei, thus forming a crescent well over a thousand miles long from the borders of Thailand almost to within eyesight of the southernmost Philippine islands. Although many difficulties stand in the way, the British and Malayan Governments say categorically that they will not be deterred from pushing the plan through. Some of the difficulties are historical and local, for the new Federation will be a rather arbitrary assemblage of widely separated territories with mixed populations at different stages of development. More important are the objections raised by Indonesia and the Philippines.
American optimism about East Asia, in precious short supply only a few years earlier, was abundantly available in 1980. "The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over forty years," Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke declared in June. Such pronouncements by U.S. policymakers were understandable: East Asia offered far more possibilities--for diplomatic overtures, for expanding trade--than anyone dared predict during the Vietnam era. But in 1980 enough warning signals were flashing throughout the region to suggest the need for a more balanced--and less buoyant--assessment.
