Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy
A self-described "revisionist," Strong uses nine case studies to refute the view that Carter bungled his foreign policy. Although acknowledging some serious problems in the handling of U.S.-Soviet relations, the author argues that Carter was neither weak nor indecisive; more often he was conscientious and consistent. Tapping into recently opened archives and valuable oral histories, Strong offers a rigorous and nuanced analysis with nary a breath of polemic. The result is the best book on Carter's foreign policy to date. Strong also persuades about the need to reappraise Carter's record. Reevaluating Carter recalls the problem in comparing Herbert Hoover with Franklin Roosevelt: historians increasingly notice Hoover's strengths as they uncover F.D.R.'s failings. As with Hoover, the comparison hints at questions about Carter's weakness as a politician and the relation of politics to presidential success. For those questions, Strong's case studies do not knit together well enough to provide the answers.
Related
While the past decade of Sino-American relations has been largely constructive, the ten years have not been on a steady incline. Rather, there have been two strong forward spurts, from spring 1971 through May 1973, and from May 1978 through early 1980. The relationship has also endured two periods of some acrimony and erosion: from the fall of 1975 to late 1976 and from mid-1980 to the effort to stabilize the relationship reflected in the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan that was agreed in August 1982. In addition to the periods of rapid forward movement and retrogression, several periods are best portrayed through metaphors such as "plateaus" or "mixed pictures." Even the best periods were punctuated by moments of doubt and uncertainty, while the phases of deterioration were constrained by a common desire to limit the erosion and to preserve a more positive public facade than the private exchanges warranted.
The differences that arise more or less regularly between the nations bordering the two sides of the North Atlantic are customarily laid to "misunderstandings." But the fact that these differences multiplied all through 1980 indicates that there exists between the United States and two of its principal European partners something of a crisis of confidence.
Between Jimmy Carter's election in 1976 and Ronald Reagan's victory in 1980, the outlook of the American people underwent one of those decisive shifts that historians generally label as watershed events. In 1976 the nation was still in the aftershock of Watergate and Vietnam--unsure of its limits as a superpower, agonizing over the moral rightness of the Vietnam War, dreading involvement in foreign commitments that in any way resembled Vietnam, preoccupied with domestic economic problems, intent on restoring the presidency to pre-Watergate levels of integrity, and dependent on détente with the Soviet Union to lighten both the defense budget and the tensions of international relations.

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