Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia
A tour de force. On one level are stories of the soldiers, scholars, and spies who ventured during the last two centuries into the rugged mountainous territory, from Iran to Tibet, that made up the nebulous border between the Russian and British empires. They were serving either Britain or Russia -- or were believed to be. Later, a few Americans and Germans joined in, combining adventurous trekking with national interest. All the accounts, diligently documented, evoke a Kiplingesque derring-do. At another level, these stories assess the strategies and characteristics of empires: the "forward school" bent on pushing imperial boundaries ever outward, the phobia over what the imperial enemy is up to, and the reluctance to abandon territory once gained. Especially well presented are the ill-fated British interventions in Afghanistan that presaged the later Soviet experience. The authors give the last word to a retired great-game player: it was just a game "with scores, but no substantive prizes."
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The Greater Good
HANS-GEORG WIECK
In his essay reviewing James Critchfield's book Partners at the Creation ("Berlin to Baghdad," July/August 2004), Timothy Naftali devalues and disparages the early postwar cooperation between the CIA and what later became West Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), its federal intelligence service. Naftali asserts that the intelligence delivered by General Reinhard Gehlen's organization and its successor, the BND, was "of no significance" and of "questionable" value.
The first engagement in the new war on terrorism -- with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan -- poses severe challenges for the United States. Rooting out bin Ladin's network will require military success in a country that the Soviet Union could not conquer in ten years of trying, as well as support from unstable surrounding nations. Washington may be tempted to try to oust the Taliban regime, but doing so could rekindle Afghanistan's brutal civil war. The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history.
Russia's post-Soviet orientation is in serious trouble. The West does not want to see any structure in Eurasia that permits Russian hegemony, but abetting continued chaos in the former Soviet space is hardly in the West's interest. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite and draw in outside powers, and the presence of nuclear weapons raises the stakes even higher. The United States should support integration, not division. For its part, Russia should work with nearby countries to help unite diverse peoples in a stabler system.
