Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia
A tour de force. On one level are stories of the soldiers, scholars, and spies who ventured during the last two centuries into the rugged mountainous territory, from Iran to Tibet, that made up the nebulous border between the Russian and British empires. They were serving either Britain or Russia -- or were believed to be. Later, a few Americans and Germans joined in, combining adventurous trekking with national interest. All the accounts, diligently documented, evoke a Kiplingesque derring-do. At another level, these stories assess the strategies and characteristics of empires: the "forward school" bent on pushing imperial boundaries ever outward, the phobia over what the imperial enemy is up to, and the reluctance to abandon territory once gained. Especially well presented are the ill-fated British interventions in Afghanistan that presaged the later Soviet experience. The authors give the last word to a retired great-game player: it was just a game "with scores, but no substantive prizes."
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The Greater Good
HANS-GEORG WIECK
In his essay reviewing James Critchfield's book Partners at the Creation ("Berlin to Baghdad," July/August 2004), Timothy Naftali devalues and disparages the early postwar cooperation between the CIA and what later became West Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), its federal intelligence service. Naftali asserts that the intelligence delivered by General Reinhard Gehlen's organization and its successor, the BND, was "of no significance" and of "questionable" value.
Russia's interests demand good relations with everyone, but older, darker forces tempt it to avenge its fall from superpowerdom. Westernizing democrats govern for now, but ex-communist elites and embittered generals scheme to re invigorate the military and reassert control over the borderlands. Their machinations are creating a fault line across the oil-rich Caucasus and Central Asia. For Russia to neglect its reconstruction to pursue the illusion of power would be a monumental mistake. While the expansion of NATO is misconceived, the West must not encourage Russian hard-liners with unmerited concessions.
To wage its war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration needed Uzbekistan's help -- and promised a lot to get it. But Washington must not let this short-term marriage of convenience give Uzbekistan long-term regional hegemony. The Uzbek regime's authoritarianism fosters Islamic extremism, which in turn exacerbates tensions among Central Asia's unstable governments. Only a multilateral approach can handle the region's many problems.
