Under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil has finally embraced modern capitalism and broken decisively with a sclerotic old economic model. The country's ambitious reforms are encouraging private investment and loosening state control. Even the 1999 currency crisis eventually ended smoothly. But the world should hold its applause until Cardoso can prove that his reforms will last. If not, his efforts will merely join Brazil's dreary list of false starts and missteps.
Juan de Onis is a former correspondent for The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. He is currently writing a book on Brazil.
NO TURNING BACK
In the past decade, Brazil has entered the first stages of a modern capitalist reorganization. Its economic transition has been gradual, but the country has avoided crippling setbacks. For many observers, Brazil seems finally to be pulling itself out of two frustrating decades of economic stagnation and political turmoil.
Not all observers accept these changes with unalloyed enthusiasm, however. The political left abhors what it portrays as an alienating, neoliberal destruction of Brazil's national development by international finance capitalism. But regardless of their preferences, everyone agrees that change is finally happening. As economic historian Ricardo Bielchowsky put it, Brazil's new economic model is radically different from its predecessor. In the new economy, investors have the freedom to make their own investment choices based on market changes. Of course, whether investors will use their new freedom to allocate resources effectively remains uncertain.
What makes Brazil's economic transition historic is that today's reforms break with an economic model that dominated the country for nearly 50 years. From 1940 to 1989, Brazil staked its hopes on a form of nationalist mercantilism that operated through state controls of commerce and credit. Centrally directed state enterprises provided infrastructure and services, while highly protected and subsidized industries and agriculture made up a dependent private sector. In 1974, Eugenio Gudin, a champion of economic liberalism, described this unique economic system as capitalist in principle but with more state control than in any other noncommunist country.
The old model fostered industrial development based on the country's large internal market. And it produced some significant strategic advances in oil, energy, and agriculture. Economic growth averaged more than six percent a year over three decades.
But Brazil's robust growth came to a halt in 1980 when its economy was buffeted by extravagant bouts of inflation. To make matters worse, a mountain of unpayable foreign debt, endemic corruption, and a chronic waste of capital all undermined fiscal discipline. When Brazil's access to foreign loans dried up during the debt crisis of the 1980s, its state-centered economy went broke. Brazil has not resumed sustained growth of this kind since.
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As in other Latin American countries that have returned to democracy this decade after bitter experiences under military regimes, Brazil's "New Republic" came to power with wide public support. The 1985 transfer of power from the military to the politicians went smoothly. The political and labor climate was relatively calm. The productive base of the economy was solid and business sectors wanted to give democracy a chance. Brazil had a foreign debt of over $100 billion, but huge trade surpluses made foreign creditors willing to refinance the debt. Under these circumstances the transition did not have to go badly. But it has.
President Sarney tells of his unexpected accession after the illness of Tancredo Neves, and explains the introduction of new political structures, the action taken on Brazil's foreign debt, and the Cruzado plan to reform the economy. He has a new vision for Brazil and expects the USA to share it.
The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
