Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone: Imperatives for U.S. Policy in South America
A succinct and clear-headed analysis of the U.S. relationship with the Mercosur trading bloc -- Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Weintraub argues that Washington has often underestimated or simply neglected the intrinsic economic importance of the Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, even as the U.S. private sector has plunged ahead. Since Mercosur's ultimate goal is creating a common market, U.S. policymakers also need to understand these countries' political aspirations. Brazil's preference for free-trade agreements within South America over hemisphere-wide negotiations with Washington, for example, arises from Brazil's belief that this approach will provide Mercosur with more leverage against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Bras'lia also sees the U.S. commitment to opening its own markets as ambiguous at best as long as Congress refuses to grant the president "fast track" authority to speed up trade deals. Yet Brazil's politically driven economic strategy may be counterproductive. As Weintraub sees it, Brazil's interest lies in liberalizing trade with the United States above all else, given that the bulk of northbound Brazilian exports are manufactured products -- the sector that would benefit most from a hemisphere-wide free-trade agreement. The author forcefully argues that the economic issues are too important to be ignored, especially during international financial crises. But he concedes that more progress has been made in areas such as democratization, where the southern cone's prospects are especially bright.
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Latin America is the forgotten part of the world. For all its potential wealth and present predicaments, it attracts neither the world's attention nor its imagination. The world sees a subcontinent with two unattractive poles, Cuba and Chile. It sees a mounting record of repression, of political incompetence and military assertiveness. Unlike Asia, the Middle East or Africa, it is for the moment an area of insulated trouble; the great powers are not actively seeking to upset the present balance. The world is content to have it remain in relative oblivion.
The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
As in other Latin American countries that have returned to democracy this decade after bitter experiences under military regimes, Brazil's "New Republic" came to power with wide public support. The 1985 transfer of power from the military to the politicians went smoothly. The political and labor climate was relatively calm. The productive base of the economy was solid and business sectors wanted to give democracy a chance. Brazil had a foreign debt of over $100 billion, but huge trade surpluses made foreign creditors willing to refinance the debt. Under these circumstances the transition did not have to go badly. But it has.
