Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia
However desirable economic reforms may be, they usually leave some groups worse off -- especially those who benefited from the old regime. This book, a fruitful collaboration between a Harvard economist and a UCLA political scientist, examines economic reform in Russia during the 1990s by looking at the reformers' political success in either coopting or isolating important sources of opposition. They find that the reformers achieved more than they are usually credited with but had to make some unsavory compromises to dislodge groups hostile to reform. The reformers curbed inflation and privatized much of public-sector enterprise but failed to overhaul the tax system -- a failure that indirectly contributed to the 1998 financial crisis. Opposition to tax reform came from groups that had been coopted earlier, notably a coalition of provincial governors and large enterprises. The authors, both of whom had first-hand experience in Russian reform, provide informed and detailed support for their interpretation of events in one of the most dramatic social experiments of the 1990s: the transformation of a decaying, centralized authoritarian regime into a market-oriented democracy.
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Ukraine has yet to solve the challenge of life after communism. Hyperinflation is just a memory and democracy is well entrenched, but production is declining, state industries remain unsold, and investors have largely stayed away. With nationalists ascendant in Russia, Ukraine needs Western money and diplomatic backing to preserve its independence and keep reform on track. A free, democratic Ukraine can serve as a model for Russia, prevent a new Soviet Union, and promote stability among its neighbors. A civil war between its Russified east and its more Ukrainian west, or its absorption into a new Russian empire, would reverberate throughout Europe.
The neoliberal economic and political models used by Western analysts to explain Russia's recent transformation ignore the interrelationship between the economy and politics. Russia is in the midst of a social revolution. Economic reform without political reform-as attempted by Yegor Gaidar-will fail. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's policies have met with some success because of accompanying political changes. This interrelated pattern of reform must continue.
Russia's era of romantic democracy is over. Boris Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 elections marked the rise of a new class of oligarchs who have profited from post-Cold War chaos. But Westerners who predict a return to authoritarianism and cultural stagnation overlook how far Russia has come since the late 1980s, and how it has opened to the world. It is not the Soviet Union, nor the land of the czars. In the short term, most Russians cannot hope for much, especially from their leaders. But with its political reforms, 98 percent privatized economy, and educated, urban population, Russia has a great deal going for it-maybe more than China.
