The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath; Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe
Two books that take very different approaches in looking at collaboration and resistance in Europe under the Nazis. The first volume examines the experiences in both eastern and western Europe, underscoring that the goal of retribution invariably collided with other objectives such as restoring social order or settling political accounts. Practically nowhere was the public record deemed fair and satisfactory. In a provocative epilogue, Tony Judt accuses the Europeans of promoting myths (e.g., that "Nazism was a strictly German phenomenon" or that Vichy was a mere "aberration in the national history") as a way of repressing their ugly past in the drive toward integration. Although many of these fictions have unraveled in recent years, Judt believes that the new Europe remains in denial about its history -- especially the communist experience in eastern Europe. Above all, this volume shows that the debate between historians who seek the truth and politicians who promote national myths will not fade soon.
In contrast, Bennett probes the ethical aspects of collaboration and resistance in a daring effort at moral philosophy. He asks whether it was legitimate to resist Nazi terror if one knew that reprisals against innocent civilians would follow. Reviewing an impressive and depressing number of cases, many from the Jewish resistance, Bennett acknowledges how limited resistance would have been had it scrupulously avoided harming civilians. Nevertheless, he vigorously condemns much of the resistance activity -- one case in point being the assassination of Heinrich Himmler's deputy in Prague, Reinhard Heydrich, which was followed by the Nazi extermination of the Czech town of Lidice. Concluding that "the worst damage that the Nazis inflicted was to make their enemies resemble them," Bennett is sure to draw criticism from Nazi-era survivors. After all, the Nazis, not the resistance, committed the atrocities. Yet such moral issues require the very kind of candid and courageous discussion shown here.
Related
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
The great solidarity Europe showed America after September 11 has started to wear off, and real differences have opened up in the transatlantic pursuit of homeland security. Europe's reluctance to take necessary steps to tighten security has made America more vulnerable. And unless cooperation improves, Europe will also be increasingly at risk.
Before World War I, German planners prepared for only one contingency: an all-out, two-front war. In July 1914, this made it difficult for Germany to match Russia's military preparations without automatically escalating into general war. Before World War II, French military planners also prepared for only one contingency: full-scale invasion of France. This made it difficult for France to react effectively when Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936. Both the German and French governments went wrong by assuming, rather than judging, where the main threat lay. Each country put tremendous effort into elaborating its war plans and force structure, down to the most minute detail. And yet each seems to have given only the most cursory attention to the political contingencies in which those plans and forces might have to be used. Hence the plans and force structures turned out to be not only irrelevant but-because of their rigidity-downright harmful.
