THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING ASSAD
Unleashing Hezbollah, stalling talks, and having the state-run media spew anti-Israel vitriol hardly seem pacific, but Syria's dictator has a consistent if chilly peace strategy.
To the Editor:
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak has not misread Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, as Henry Siegman suggests ("Being Hafiz al-Assad," May/June 2000). Barak is aware that Assad remains an anachronistic pan-Arabist who has not caught up with modern realities better understood by those Assad disdains: Palestine Liberation Organization Chair Yasir Arafat, the late King Hussein of Jordan, and the visionary Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt.
The ailing Assad wants his legacy to be steadfastness against concessions in the name of Arab honor. Although aware of Assad's rigidity, Barak hoped to be more successful in peacemaking than his predecessors by creating the widest possible coalition government. That, along with his strong electoral mandate, would make possible the concessions required for peace with Syria -- but not without reciprocity.
Siegman attributes the recent stall in negotiations to the leaking of American peace proposals that embarrassed Assad and to Barak's decision not to publicize Israel's agreement to withdraw to the 1967 border until he could show skeptical Israelis what they would get from Assad in return. To make peace with Syria, Barak needs his coalition to stay intact. Therefore, he is in no position to conduct secret diplomacy or depend on "creative U.S. diplomacy." Leaking the American draft let Israelis, who are correctly suspicious of Assad, know Assad's real intentions. Most Israelis doubt that Assad wants peace and suspect he is angling for U.S. support to modernize his ailing army.
Barak has committed himself to a referendum on a peace agreement with Syria. Already, Likud leader Ariel Sharon is organizing opposition to the referendum, which will probably be based on a majority of the entire population, not a majority of those who vote that day. Barak understands that only a broad coalition government could persuade the nation to vote to withdraw from the Golan Heights and return to the 1967 border with Syria.
AMOS PERLMUTTER
Professor of Political Science, American University
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The USA should not make the same mistake with Syrian President Assad, that it made with Iraq's Saddam Hussain. "Assad now needs US favor more than the reverse. Yet he will try to induce Washington to pay him for allowing himself to be helped; this must not happen. US-Syrian relations can prosper only if American officials adhere to positions that are morally grounded and politically sound".
After more than 50 years of Zionist activities-among them many decades over the international diplomatic front-and on looking back on the experiences gained in the 20 years of the existence of the state of Israel, I am beginning to have doubts as to whether the establishment of the state of Israel as it is today, a state like all other states in structure and form, was the fullest accomplishment of the Zionist idea and its twofold aim: to save Jews suffering from discrimination and persecution by giving them the opportunity for a decent and meaningful life in their own homeland; second, to ensure the survival of the Jewish people against the threat of disintegration and disappearance in those parts of the world where they enjoy full equality of rights. In expressing and explaining these thoughts, I want to make it clear that I have no doubt as to the historical justification and moral validity of Zionism. The concentration of a large part of the Jewish people in their own national home, where they are masters of their destiny, seems to me to be the only way to solve what has been called for centuries "the Jewish problem."
According to many observers, Syria's Bashar al-Assad was supposed to be immune to the kind of popular protest that swept the country today. Ironically, the basis was Assad’s own public relations strategy. With no real legitimacy, his only resort to stop the protests will be violence.
This article appears in the Foreign Affairs/CFR eBook, The New Arab Revolt.

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