A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945
A brisk, vehement, and well-written operational history of World War II drawing on English, American, and German sources, this book does not pretend to delve into the works in the many other languages that deal with the greatest conflict of the twentieth century. Rather, its strength lies in its clear focus -- the conduct of military campaigns -- and its sound grasp of military organization, tactics, and technology, the rudiments of which are covered in well-conceived appendices. With a deep respect for the suffering of common soldiers, the authors do not hesitate to lambaste the high commands of each of the participating nations. These two veteran military historians have produced a sharply opinionated work that rests on an unabashed belief that this was a war of good against evil -- insofar as the Western powers were concerned, at any rate.
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Europe is about to create a unified military force. Done wrong, it could strain transatlantic relations and weaken European defense.
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.
Nato's "disarray" has been made into a crisis by President de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces and facilities from the integrated structure of the Alliance. For the other NATO powers, and for the United States, this has provided a shock, but-in some ways-a salutary one. The fundamental issues of Europe's future, of Soviet-Western relations and of American policy are now more likely to be addressed. Before the French action these issues would likely have been evaded. Now there still is time to think relatively slowly and carefully about the objectives of the European-American alliance and of the United States itself in Europe's affairs.
