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A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, 1937-1945

Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett
Reviewed by By Eliot A. Cohen
September/October 2000
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Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett
Harvard University Press
2000
656 pp.
067400163X
$35.00

A brisk, vehement, and well-written operational history of World War II drawing on English, American, and German sources, this book does not pretend to delve into the works in the many other languages that deal with the greatest conflict of the twentieth century. Rather, its strength lies in its clear focus -- the conduct of military campaigns -- and its sound grasp of military organization, tactics, and technology, the rudiments of which are covered in well-conceived appendices. With a deep respect for the suffering of common soldiers, the authors do not hesitate to lambaste the high commands of each of the participating nations. These two veteran military historians have produced a sharply opinionated work that rests on an unabashed belief that this was a war of good against evil -- insofar as the Western powers were concerned, at any rate.

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