MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero; Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War
The 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War is a suitable time for reflection, and these two new books do just that. Weintraub's excellent account tracks the opening and conduct of the war on the American side until spring 1951, after the front stabilized and President Truman fired his supreme commander in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur. As a campaign book, it is well written for the general reader yet still offers solid scholarship. Weintraub, a Korean war veteran, has a perceptive eye for action and makes clear-eyed judgments that are generally damning to MacArthur -- and to the high command in Washington. Although he is less knowledgeable about the wider strategic context, Weintraub has read enough to get by.
Thornton, in contrast, puts the larger strategic context of the Korean War at the center of his study of the interactions of Stalin, Mao, and Truman. Using much of the new evidence, he offers careful analysis of their plans. This approach is commendable and often acutely perceptive in detail. But Thornton overreaches in his interpretations of all three major actors. He sees Stalin deliberately entrapping Mao in a war to stop a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement that Mao supposedly wanted. He has the Truman administration welcoming Chinese intervention to justify its program for American rearmament. Poor Mao himself is cast as the victim, the "odd man out" of the title. But none of these big conclusions withstand scrutiny.
Related
After more than 50 years of dominating Northeast Asian diplomacy, Washington must now accommodate the fallout from the historic rapprochement between North and South Korea. As regional leaders take the reins of diplomacy, they face an uncertain future and lack the institutions that could guide the transition. The next U.S. administration can help, but not until it rethinks its own regional policies.
Security is like oxygen: you tend not to notice it until you lose it. A continued U.S. presence in East Asia provides the oxygen that is so crucial for the region's stability and economic prosperity. Critics who call the Clinton administration's strategy myopic misunderstand the firm U.S. alliance with Japan and the importance of East Asia to U.S. national interests. The United States must maintain its troops, develop regional institutions, bolster its allies, and remain deeply engaged in Asia.
The Defense Department's new report on East Asia reads as if the Cold War is ongoing. For Japan, the report signals U.S. acceptance of its ruinous trade deficits. For other Asian nations, it signals the hollowness of American superpower pretensions. The report masks the failure of the Clinton administration's trade policy. By insisting Japan remain a U.S. protectorate, Washington encourages Tokyo's reactionaries. The real threat to Asian security is not China but U.S. distrust of Japan as a true ally. Cold War military power is irrelevant to the economic challenges posed by East Asia's dynamism. Someone should tell the Pentagon.

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