Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War
President Clinton and some of his leading officials, especially Anthony Lake and Madeleine Albright, have emphasized the critical challenge that "rogue states" pose to U.S. foreign policy. In response, Litwak makes two arguments. First, he finds the "rogue" label much too simplistic; it lumps together quite different countries and problems so as to satisfy the American appetite for exemplary villains. Although Litwak could have been more forgiving about the need to find some way to describe those closed, dictatorial states that reject American norms, his argument against oversimplification is persuasive. Second, he argues that the "rogue" category keeps Washington from fashioning the differentiated policies it needs for nations like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. This second point is less persuasive. Litwak's good case studies prove that U.S. policies toward these "rogues" already vary considerably to take account of differing circumstances. Since "rogue state" rhetoric does not seem to mean much in practice, Litwak's critique knocks down a straw man. Still, he was not the one who stuffed this scarecrow.
Related
Nuclear weapons, as great enhancers of national power, are attractive to U.S. allies, orphan states left outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and hostile rogue states. The collapse of the Soviet Union has brought into the open the growing desire for nuclear status, which the United States will have to discourage through continuing diplomacy and security commitments. Thwarting rogue states like Iraq and North Korea may eventually require preventive war, though it might take a nuclear exchange for Washington to reach that conclusion.
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.
So far, the Bush administration has shown it would like to resolve its problems with North Korea and Iran the same way it did with Iraq: through regime change. It is easy to see why. But the strategy is unlikely to work, at least not quickly enough. A much broader approach -- involving talks, sanctions, and the threat of force -- is needed.

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