Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World; Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era
In her modest and useful book, Von Hippel summarizes recent U.S. efforts to use military intervention to rebuild nations. Of the case studies on Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, she finds qualified successes everywhere but Somalia -- which she judges a resounding failure -- and tries to draw out some lessons learned.
A good place to find such lessons is Latham's fine study of the nation-building struggles of the Kennedy administration. Social science hubris, especially among economists, is a constant then and now. Another constant is the impatience of American purveyors of modernity with local "traditional" ways of doing things. On the positive side, many Kennedy-era officials genuinely seemed to care about the gritty details of political and economic development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Latham rightly argues that the Cold War does not fully explain this secular evangelism, which has much older roots. As America's civilizing mission continues, more disingenuously, into the twenty-first century, Latham's story hints at present foibles while evoking some nostalgia for the idealism of the past.
Related
The debates over Kosovo blurred the old divisions between liberals and conservatives, but they did not rise above an even older split in American politics and foreign policy: the enduring divide between a hawkish South and a dovish North. Regional differences based on culture and values have made Greater New England the heartland of opposition to foreign wars and the U.S. military establishment since the 1700s; they have also made the South a bastion of interventionism. All too often, the regional divides over U.S. foreign policy have just been a reprise of the Civil War -- and they are a recipe for paralysis.
As Afghanistan has shown, keeping the peace in foreign lands requires a variety of tools--some of which Washington just does not have. Rather than avoid peacekeeping entirely, the U.S. government ends up sending in elite military units that get bogged down for years. Developing a constabulary force would be a better answer.
The Cold War culture of military restraint has given way to increasing atrocities. By remaining a passive witness in the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, and Chechnya, the United States damages its moral economy. Yet none of these conflicts sufficiently threatens U.S. interests to rouse the nation to arms. The United States should therefore return to the calculating siege craft common before Napoleon, which stressed minimal casualties, partial results, and patience. Every war need not be a heroic national crusade.

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