Francois Mitterrand: The Last French President
A wonderfully informative, entertaining, and comprehensive study of Mitterrand. Tiersky describes a complex, seductive, and secretive man with enormous ambition, strong loyalty to often dubious friends, and considerable fondness for cunning (sometimes with disastrous results for his career). There was never anything unequivocal about him. In many respects Mitterrand was the opposite of de Gaulle, whose prestige and mythic authority he resented. Yet he used his presidency in a truly Gaullist manner, and his commitment to European integration was probably his greatest display of statecraft. After Mitterrand, Tiersky writes, no French president will ever again wield so much power, given the subsequent changes in French society and new European constraints on French sovereignty -- and no future president will be able to use Machiavellian reasoning on governance as shamelessly. Tiersky's volume is the story of both the man and his country, covering an enormous amount of ground in both respects. Yet its greatest merit is that it unwittingly provides the reader with all the reasons necessary to render a verdict less admiring of Mitterrand than the author has.
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Three years after having signed a treaty of coöperation with Dr. Adenauer, designed to make the marriage of France and Germany the foundation for the regrouping of Europe, General de Gaulle has travelled to the Soviet Union to talk of rediscovered friendship, agreement and even "alliance" between the "new France" and the "new Russia." Now the latter, pending information to the contrary, is the principal adversary of the German Federal Republic, and the Soviet leaders do not hide the fact that they look upon the rapprochement with Paris as a means of gaining support against German "revanchism." We may therefore be permitted to question the degree of coherence in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic and to wonder whether such changes of course-there are other examples-cannot be best explained by psychological factors, the first of them being excessive amour propre.
In 1962 the European enthusiasts in Brussels were explaining regretfully that although British membership would slow down the process of European integration-perhaps severely impede the whole movement toward a United States of Europe-it was a price that had to be paid for widening the geographical spread of the Community. No doubt these people, while regretting the manner of General de Gaulle's rupture of negotiations with Britain, are now privately relieved that the price will not have to be paid. Their view is that Britain's inherent weakness is such that she will be compelled sooner or later to come back and knock on the door again and plead for entry into the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). On the whole, better later than sooner. The European Community will by then have consolidated itself; it will be able to impose its terms with less difficulty and, in fairness it should be added, will be less niggling about making small concessions which may contravene the letter, though not the spirit, of the Treaty of Rome.

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