HEAR NO EVIL
Advocates of humanitarian intervention often claim that 5,000 U.N. troops alone could have staved off the Rwandan genocide in 1994. But a more realistic appraisal suggests that an intervention of any size would have required much more time and logistical planning than most proponents care to admit. Given the genocide's terrifying pace, even a major mission by the West could have saved only a fraction of the ultimate victims. Herewith a reassessment of the limits of intervention.
To the Editor:
Alan J. Kuperman's "Rwanda in Retrospect" (January/February 2000) and the subsequent responses debate the availability of information to Western decision-makers that could have allowed them to act expeditiously to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide or stop it once it began.
The basic problem was not the availability of information but rather that only information reported by Western sources was deemed credible. In Rwanda, both the preparations for genocide and the orders to kill were propagated in the extremist media, including the notorious Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines. Many Rwandans, the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front included, shouted loud and clear warnings that large-scale massacres were in the offing, and when they occurred, that genocide had begun.
The world rarely listens, however, unless that same information is repeated by a "Western" source. These reports, in turn, are often clouded by underlying perceptions and presumptions that are sometimes completely at odds with the African experience. Therein lies the fundamental paradox of erroneous decision-making in the globalized world, as far as our continent is concerned.
Richard Sezibera
Ambassador of Rwanda to the United States
Related
Advocates of humanitarian intervention often claim that 5,000 U.N. troops alone could have staved off the Rwandan genocide in 1994. But a more realistic appraisal suggests that an intervention of any size would have required much more time and logistical planning than most proponents care to admit. Given the genocide's terrifying pace, even a major mission by the West could have saved only a fraction of the ultimate victims. Herewith a reassessment of the limits of intervention.
Alan J. Kuperman plays word games to rationalize the West's ignominious failure to halt genocide in Rwanda, writes Alison L. Des Forges. Kuperman responds.
Seven years after more than 500,000 Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda, the world still cannot explain why. Mahmood Mamdani's When Victims Become Killers is a rich history of Hutu and Tutsi identity, but how it applies to the genocide is unclear.
