NUCLEAR SHIELD
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear danger is rising. Despite the end of the struggle in whose name the great nuclear arsenals were built, Washington now seeks to stop proliferation while holding on to its own arsenal indefinitely. But as nuclear restrictions falter -- battered by India's and Pakistan's tests, Iraq's defiance, North Korea's missiles, and the U.S. missile-defense plan -- the absence of a middle ground becomes stark. Holding on to nuclear arms is not a deterrent but a "proliferant" that goads others to join the club. Arms control has become a way of avoiding a fateful choice: a world of uncontrolled proliferation or a world with no nuclear weapons at all.
To the Editor:
Jonathan Schell and Igor Ivanov make the same point: deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD) would be destabilizing because it would promote a new round of nuclear proliferation and deployment worldwide ("The Folly of Arms Control" and "The Missile-Defense Mistake," September/October 2000). Although this conjecture may be true, it is just as likely that NMD would have the opposite effect. A stable world may be one in which the United States can act to secure peace without the fear of a nuclear attack.
Schell and Ivanov's concern that NMD would promote new proliferation is also rife with curious speculation. Since western Europe has not shown an inclination to spend more than an aggregate one percent of GDP on defense, why would a U.S. defense prompt more significant spending, especially if this defense gives the United States flexibility in neutralizing hostile gestures directed at Europe by rogue states? Similarly, how would Russia mount a nuclear buildup when it cannot meet conventional arms expenditures today?
If, by the way, NMD is not feasible, as Schell suggests, then the Chinese have nothing to worry about. If it is feasible, particularly during boost phase when missiles are slow and hot, then deterrence is enhanced, since the Chinese can't possibly know which of their missiles can penetrate our defenses.
Like Schell, I believe it would be desirable to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. But since that may be the most romantic idea of all, NMD may turn out to be a reasonable way to achieve the goal he proposes. Moving from a world where civilian populations are held hostage to nuclear incineration to a world in which the nuclear threat is reduced is, to me, both moral and stabilizing.
Herb London
President, Hudson Institute
Related
Calls for a more pragmatic judgment of the technological implications of military trends. Reviews significance of strategic defence, ICBMs and counterforce, targeting, basing, SLBMs and cruise missiles. Recommends "specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization".
Gives an account of problems encountered by START negotiators in 1988, as minor issues about particular types of weapons turned into major issues. Notes that these problems will persist post-Regan and concludes that "before a new administration can pick up where the old one leaves off in START" it should (1) impose some order in the chaos of US thinking about ICBMs (2) decide whether there is a militarily-sound mission for nuclear-armed SLCMs (3) develop a realistic plan for strategic defense R&D.
The time is ripe for a global program to reduce existing nuclear arsenals and prevent their further proliferation. The immediate tasks are to execute agreed-upon bilateral reductions in U.S. and Russian forces, assure that Russia remains the only nuclear weapon state of the old Soviet Union, and strengthen the international effort against the spread of nuclear weapons by tougher monitoring. Further steps to take under U.S. leadership include: adopting a "no first use" doctrine except as a last defensive resort to deter a nuclear attack; ending new weapons tests and phasing out safety tests by 1996; replacing the goal of strategic defense against missiles with a limited defense objective, and seeking Russian agreement on a warhead ceiling lower than the accepted range of 3,000-3,500. Effective future action will require a stronger policy of public explanation from American political leaders than ever before.
