China may be the most important country in America's future. Its power is undoubtedly on the rise, and Washington must give it due regard. U.S.-China relations have recently made great progress, particularly on trade-related issues. But the relationship is fraught with tensions that could explode into conflict at any time. The next administration needs to get China policy right, before disaster strikes.
David Shambaugh is Director of the China Policy Program and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University. He is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. His newest book, Modernizing China's Military: Progress and Problems, will be published later this year by the University of California Press.
CHINA POLICY IN TRANSITION
The campaign is over and, although the rhetorical smoke about whether China is a strategic partner or competitor still lingers, the new U.S. administration must now craft and implement its policies toward China and Taiwan. The president's foreign policy and security team has to adjust itself to a number of pressing realities, so the White House should move with dispatch to process senior China and Asia appointments and begin systematic policy reviews. This group should focus on both the current U.S.-China agenda -- which includes some important issues that require immediate attention -- and the broader context of the U.S.-China relationship. First, the administration must handle some pressing issues.
THE IMMEDIATE AGENDA
The fragility and inherent dangers of the Taiwan situation command immediate attention. In April, the United States will have to make the next round of decisions on conventional arms sales to Taiwan. The decision, deferred last year, on whether to sell Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with sophisticated aegis battle-management systems and antimissile defenses will be particularly sensitive and has the potential to precipitate a diplomatic crisis with Beijing. The administration needs to be prepared for the fallout if it decides to proceed. U.S. policymakers will also face ongoing choices about helping Taiwan upgrade its military command-and-control infrastructure and potentially providing theater missile defenses (TMD) for the island.
Second, the need to jump-start a dialogue and build a sustainable framework of interaction between Beijing and Taipei is pressing. The current impasse between the two sides is fraught with danger -- it threatens U.S. interests (and potentially soldiers' lives), as well as broader peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
While not trying to mediate the intractable problem, the new administration should actively seek to bring the two sides to the bargaining table. This is not a problem amenable to easy solutions, and any resolution must be agreed on by both sides rather than imposed by either one. But Washington's considerable influence and leverage could help move the situation forward, if a careful mix of policy instruments is applied toward both sides.
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The simmering dispute over the status of Taiwan may soon explode in violence. The Chinese regime sees Taiwan's recent democratization as an implicit challenge to its own authority and legitimacy and thus continues to threaten and intimidate the island. Meanwhile, Taiwan has procured advanced defensive weapons from the United States. Growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, along with the lack of military and diplomatic communication, make conflict -- possibly involving the United States -- increasingly likely. To avoid such an outcome, Washington should actively facilitate cross-strait dialogue and deter provocations by either side. But it must do so soon, for both China and Taiwan are growing impatient.
George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead.
Although neither China nor Taiwan wants war, both pursue policies that raise the risk of bloodshed: the first by issuing vague warnings, the second by testing their limits. To stabilize the situation, the Bush administration should help broker a temporary agreement under which Taipei would put off independence and Beijing would stop threatening to attack.
