After more than 50 years of dominating Northeast Asian diplomacy, Washington must now accommodate the fallout from the historic rapprochement between North and South Korea. As regional leaders take the reins of diplomacy, they face an uncertain future and lack the institutions that could guide the transition. The next U.S. administration can help, but not until it rethinks its own regional policies.
Kent E. Calder recently served as Special Adviser to two U.S. ambassadors to Japan. He is Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Princeton University.
RUMBLINGS IN THE EAST
Northeast Asia, specialists have long argued, is among the most dangerous places on earth. Only there are the world's three principal nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, and China) and the two largest economic powers (the United States and Japan) still politically and geographically engaged -- their interests entwined in a volatile arc surrounding Japan. It was in that region that three years of bitter Korean conflict half a century ago shaped the Cold War for two generations. As other global hot spots moved fitfully toward peace, Korea remained locked in conflict. To this day, Northeast Asia lacks a regional security framework analogous to NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and there is still no peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, where more than a million troops from opposing sides remain deployed within miles of each other.
Yet when Kim Dae Jung of South Korea and Kim Jong Il of the North met on the tarmac at Pyongyang last June 13, the region's past and present tensions seemed to be giving way to the promise of future cooperation. The remarkably positive chemistry of the initial meetings produced tangible results. Within little more than two months, North and South Korea had agreed to rebuild roads and railways across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), resolved to re-establish a liaison office in Panmunjom (a village in the DMZ used as a neutral setting for international discussions), and completed an emotional series of visits between family members who had been separated for nearly 50 years. Soon afterward, their athletes marched under a common flag at the Sydney Olympics.
These initiatives marked a significant shift in regional diplomacy. For the first time since World War II, Seoul and Pyongyang -- rather than Washington, Moscow, or Beijing -- were driving events. The two Koreas sensed that they were on center stage and relished their new place in the sun.
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Pacific powers would like Korea to reunify slowly, but the North is soon likely to implode, its economy deteriorating as its weapons of mass destruction accumulate. Rapid reunification would spur economic growth, as in Germany, and reduce regional tensions. South Korea's liberalization of its own economy and strengthening of its civic institutions will prepare it to assist the North. China and Russia may not go along, but Western governments should stop coddling Pyongyang. America should underwrite a united Korea's security, and Japan its finances.
After the historic summit between Pyongyang and Seoul last June, the Koreas could be on their way to eventual reunification. To ensure such progress, Washington should consider making military and economic concessions -- including the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces -- to formally end the Korean War.
Reexamining the 30 and more years since Indochina entered the agenda of world problems one is struck constantly by the curious mirages, the discordance between image and reality which seem to persist not only in American perceptions of Indochina but in the evaluations by other great powers and the Indochinese themselves of the actual nature and goals of U.S. policy.
