Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas
One of the most dramatic events of 2000 was the cordial summit of the two Kims of North and South Korea, the fruits of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" that has thawed the half-century-long freeze. Greater economic, cultural, family, and political contact was tentatively agreed on, but no one knows where it will lead. Noland looks ahead to potential unification and to several possible intermediate points. He summarizes well what limited information is available on the reclusive northern hermit nation and analyzes skillfully both the economic benefits and the political risks of opening up the North Korean economy. Drawing on the unification of Germany, he maps out the lessons for South Koreans (and others) should they need to respond quickly to their northern neighbor's collapse. He sees tremendous difficulties in North Korea due to 50 years of systematic mismanagement under communist rule. But imminent collapse is unlikely as long as Pyongyang plays its cards skillfully -- as it has been doing -- and as long as China fears the unknown alternatives more than the current (albeit unpalatable) regime.
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Relations between Washington and Seoul have never been better. But if the two do not reconcile differences on North Korea and seal the deal on a Free Trade Agreement, the alliance will suffer.
Pacific powers would like Korea to reunify slowly, but the North is soon likely to implode, its economy deteriorating as its weapons of mass destruction accumulate. Rapid reunification would spur economic growth, as in Germany, and reduce regional tensions. South Korea's liberalization of its own economy and strengthening of its civic institutions will prepare it to assist the North. China and Russia may not go along, but Western governments should stop coddling Pyongyang. America should underwrite a united Korea's security, and Japan its finances.
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.

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