The Federal Future of Europe: From the European Community to the European Union; Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950-2000
The European Union's disappointing summit last December underlined how much European integration is caught in conflicting drives and aspirations. The EU's functional scope is broader than ever, thanks to monetary union and the new move toward a rapid reaction force. Its planned enlargement will extend its reach to the whole continent. But its system of governance is too Byzantine to function well, too obscure to be understood by its citizens, and too paralyzed by antagonisms. Neither the potential new members nor the United Kingdom seem willing to move toward a more federal structure. The tensions between the smaller and the larger states are acute, and the Franco-German "axis" is cracked.
In these two works, Sidjanski and Burgess focus on the debate between "federalists" and "intergovernmentalists" that has raged for decades. Burgess concerns himself with theories of European integration, trying to measure how far federalism has been achieved. But his conclusion -- that the EU has both confederal and federal elements, and these two schemes actually share many common features -- is a somewhat disappointing cop-out. (These elements in fact tend to lead in different directions, as the United States found out in its early years.) Sidjanski, in contrast, provides an eminently clear account of the EU's origins and development, arguing that federalism is both Europe's future and the best way to contain excessive nationalism. He devotes much space to the Balkan tragedies, which Burgess barely mentions, but his focus leads him into a different kind of trap. He analyzes the EU's evolution as a troubled yet necessary march toward federalism but fails to ask what it would take to build a European public space -- and whether there can be a European federation without a European "people." He seems torn between his faith and his awareness of the obstacles to federation.
Related
Reviews the record of recent French diplomacy including support for NATO in the early 1980s, Chad, Lebanon, and the 'Rainbow Warrior' affair. "Yet France cannot remain prisoner of her great past and of the myths created by de Gaulle". Her future lies within a European framework, within which the issues of her nuclear deterrent, her lack of adequate conventional military strength, and her declining economic competitiveness must all be addressed. Summarized in D Moïsi 'A threatened France must retreat to Europe' IHT 9 Sep 1988 p4.
Antony Blinken has missed a fundamental transformation at work. America and Europe may still share values and interests, but Europe and the world have changed profoundly since the Cold War. The transatlantic relationship must change, too.
America now faces the prospect of economic conflicts with both Europe and East Asia. The United States and the European Union have already fired the first shots of retaliatory sanctions over their ever-growing trade disputes. On the other side of the world, meanwhile, Asian countries are creating a bloc of their own that could include preferential trade arrangements and an Asian Monetary Fund. These developments could produce a tripolar world and hamper global economic integration. To avert this outcome, the United States must quell its domestic backlash against globalization and reassert its economic leadership in the world. The new Bush administration should make multilateral trade liberalization a top priority -- or it will face unpleasant economic and political consequences as the U.S. and foreign economies slow.
